Whither gene patenting and the patenting of diagnostic methods post-Mayo and Myriad? The need for certainty in navigating the high seas of policy by SAW, Cheng Lim
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
11-2016
Whither gene patenting and the patenting of
diagnostic methods post-Mayo and Myriad? The
need for certainty in navigating the high seas of
policy
Cheng Lim SAW
Singapore Management University, clsaw@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2016.1250379
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
SAW, Cheng Lim. Whither gene patenting and the patenting of diagnostic methods post-Mayo and Myriad? The need for certainty in
navigating the high seas of policy. (2016). Law, Innovation and Technology. 8, (2), 207-246. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1821
1 
 
 
Whither gene patenting and the patenting of diagnostic methods post-Mayo 
and Myriad? The need for certainty in navigating the high seas of policy 
 
Cheng Lim Saw* 
 
This paper is prompted by a series of recent high-profile decisions emanating from the 
apex courts in the US and Australia – namely, Mayo and Myriad – on the patent 
eligibility of gene-based inventions. Adopting a comparative approach, this paper 
critically examines whether isolated gene sequences and diagnostic methods qualify as 
patentable subject matter in several leading jurisdictions, including the US, Australia, 
Europe and the UK. An attempt will also be made, after carefully considering various 
arguments on both sides of the policy debate, at predicting what the future might hold (or, 
perhaps more accurately, at suggesting what the future ought to be) for gene patenting 
and the patenting of diagnostic methods in the global biotechnology landscape. 
Keywords: Biotechnological inventions; Human genetics; Molecular diagnostics; 
Public health; Comparative law; Patentable subject matter; Patent 
eligibility; Discovery-invention distinction; EU Biotech Directive 
 
1. Introduction 
Huge advances made in genetics and the phenomenal development of modern biotechnology 
have, in recent times, fuelled both the intensity and the range of questions as to what can and 
should be protected by patent law.1  In May 2013, Hollywood actress Angelina Jolie made 
headlines when she disclosed to the world that she had undergone a preventive double 
mastectomy after genetic tests, developed and patented by Myriad Genetics Inc, revealed that she 
had a heightened risk of contracting breast cancer.2  That episode must have revived (or at least 
added to) the debate as to whether patent protection – to be conferred on the sole provider of 
BRCA genetic testing in the US – ought to extend to isolated gene sequences (and, by 
                                                          
* LLB (Hons) (Singapore), LLM (Cambridge); Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore); Associate Professor, School of 
Law, Singapore Management University. This research project was supported by the Singapore Ministry of 
Education (MOE) Academic Research Fund (AcRF) Tier 1 grant. Profound thanks are also due to then-Professor 
George Wei (now Justice Wei): but for his towering presence and encouragement on 13 June 2013 (cf. Myriad), this 
paper would not have seen the light of day. All the usual disclaimers apply. 
1 Inspired by Justice Wei’s observation in Warner-Lambert Company LLC v Novartis (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2016] 
SGHC 106 at [122]. 
2 See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html?_r=0. 
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association, diagnostic methods).  Another related question, on a more practical note, concerns 
whether BRCA genetic testing is at all accessible to the woman on the street in terms of pricing 
and affordability. 
Because these questions squarely engage the policy and purpose of patent law, it is unsurprising 
that different jurisdictions approach the matter from different legal standpoints.  Over time, what 
has emerged, through legislative activity and case law developments, is that there are essentially 
two schools of thought.  Whereas the US and, more recently, Australia have taken the view that 
isolated gene sequences per se are not patentable subject matter, the EU and the UK, since 1998, 
have taken the opposite view (subject to certain criteria being met).  These differing perspectives 
clearly demonstrate the highly sophisticated and controversial nature of the topic under 
consideration, particularly when public policy (here, in healthcare) looms large in the 
discussion.3  Insofar as this jurisprudential divide amongst nations is concerned, whether or not 
the famous expression ‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet’ continues 
to hold true for the foreseeable future remains to be seen. 
The science underpinning the patenting of naturally occurring gene sequences which have been 
isolated has already been comprehensively elucidated elsewhere4 and will therefore not be re-
introduced in this paper.  Instead, this paper sets out to critically examine – on a comparative 
basis – how courts in different (leading) jurisdictions grapple with this vexed question 
concerning the patent eligibility of naturally occurring genetic material and methods of 
diagnosis.  An attempt will also be made, after carefully considering various arguments on both 
sides of the policy debate, at predicting what the future might hold (or, perhaps more accurately, 
at suggesting what the future ought to be) for gene patenting and the patenting of diagnostic 
methods in the global biotechnology landscape. 
This paper is in two principal parts.  The first part sets out and reviews the relevant jurisprudence 
in the US, Canada, Australia, the EU and the UK.  Competing policy arguments, for and against 
treating isolated gene sequences and related diagnostic methods as patentable subject matter, are 
then considered in the second part. 
2. The status of gene and diagnostic method patents across jurisdictions 
2.1 US 
We begin with a survey of American jurisprudence.  The legislative starting point is section 101 
of the US Patent Act (‘§101’) which defines patentable subject matter thus:5 
                                                          
3 As Justice Burrough once said in Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229 at 252, public policy is ‘… a very unruly 
horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you’. 
4 For an excellent exposition of the relevant science, see D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc [2015] HCA 35 (‘D’Arcy’) 
at [39]-[61], [100]-[113] and [194]-[216]; D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc (2014) 313 ALR 627; [2014] FCAFC 115 
at [16]-[63]; Amelia Rinehart, ‘Myriad Lessons Learned’ (2015) 5 UC Irvine Law Review 1147 at 1150-1153. 
5 35 USC §101. 
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Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
It is conventional wisdom that this provision contains an implicit, judicially-created exception to 
patent eligibility known as the ‘laws of nature’ or ‘products of nature’ exception.  Other notable 
exceptions which have been espoused by the courts include ‘natural phenomena’ and ‘abstract 
ideas’.6  These exceptions to patent eligibility exist because they are said to represent ‘the basic 
tools of scientific and technological work’7 or ‘the building blocks of human ingenuity’.8  
Indeed, the US Supreme Court (‘USSC’) had, in 1948, emphatically declared that laws of nature 
ought to be ‘free to all men and reserved exclusively to none’.9 
Whereas the US had, for many years, acquired the reputation for being a patent-friendly 
jurisdiction,10 the USSC has, in more recent times, begun to use §101 as a convenient tool for 
filtering out unmeritorious subject matter from the ambit of patentability.  This is particularly 
true as regards the patenting of diagnostic methods and naturally occurring gene sequences that 
have been isolated. 
For all products which are derived from nature to constitute patentable subject matter, the 
guiding principle has always been that the invention in question must contain ‘markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature’11 – i.e. the need for some measure of ‘human 
intervention’.  The same principle applies to process inventions as well – where the claims in 
question must do ‘significantly more’ than simply set out the underlying law of nature 
(sometimes referred to as the need for an ‘inventive concept’) – and this has been reaffirmed by 
the USSC in Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc (‘Mayo’).12 
In Mayo, the claims in question were to processes that allowed doctors, treating patients with 
autoimmune diseases, to understand the correlation between the concentration in the blood of 
certain metabolites and the likelihood that the dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective 
or induce harmful side-effects.  Essentially, the patent covered methods of (non-genetic) 
diagnostic testing.  When the respondent (Prometheus) – the exclusive licensee of the patent – 
subsequently sued the petitioner (Mayo) for patent infringement, the patent eligibility of the 
                                                          
6 Diamond v Chakrabarty 447 US 303 at 309 (1980) (‘Chakrabarty’); Diamond v Diehr 450 US 175 at 185 (1981); 
Bilski v Kappos 130 S Ct 3218 at 3225 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc 132 S 
Ct 1289 at 1293 (2012) (‘Mayo’); Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics Inc 133 S Ct 2107 at 
2116 (2013) (‘Myriad’). 
7 Gottschalk v Benson 409 US 63 at 67 (1972). 
8 Alice Corp Pty Ltd v CLS Bank Int’l 134 S Ct 2347 at 2354 (2014) (‘Alice’). 
9 Funk Bros Seed Co v Kalo Inoculant Co 333 US 127 at 130 (1948). This view was subsequently endorsed in 
Chakrabarty at 309. 
10 Indeed, it was the intent of the US Congress – since the early 1950s – that patentable subject matter should 
‘include anything under the sun that is made by man’ (see Chakrabarty at 309). 
11 Chakrabarty at 310. 
12 132 S Ct 1289 at 1294 (2012). Indeed, to be patent eligible, the claims ‘must do more than simply state the law of 
nature while adding the words “apply it”’ (Ibid.). 
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claimed processes was put in issue.  Justice Breyer, for a unanimous court, held that the subject 
matter of the claims was not patent eligible because it simply recited laws of nature.  Upholding 
such a patent ‘would significantly impede future innovation’ premised on these underlying 
natural laws.13  Furthermore, the additional steps outlined in the claimed processes entailed 
‘well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific 
community’.14  The court therefore concluded that the patent in suit effectively claimed the 
underlying laws of nature themselves and had not transformed them into patent eligible 
applications of those laws.  Prometheus’ patent was consequently invalidated. 
Arguably, the Mayo decision can be regarded as an important turning point in US patent 
jurisprudence insofar as biotechnology is concerned.  In particular, it clearly reflects a much 
more restrained and measured judicial response to the patenting of diagnostic methods.  After all, 
Justice Breyer did acknowledge the contribution of Prometheus’ patent to the existing art:15 
… those in the field did not know the precise correlations between metabolite levels and 
likely harm or ineffectiveness. The patent claims at issue here set forth processes 
embodying researchers’ findings that identified these correlations with some precision. 
If so, can it not be argued on the facts that something ‘more’ than simply restating the natural 
law itself had been claimed in the patent?  Unfortunately, the patentee in Mayo was found to 
have made a ‘discovery’ per se, as its claims revealing the precise correlations – which no doubt 
represented a significant breakthrough for treating autoimmune diseases – did not, in the court’s 
view, constitute an ‘invention’.16  We shall return to the discovery-invention divide later in this 
paper.  It may nevertheless be possible to rationalise Mayo, on the premise of policy, by 
suggesting that the USSC was perhaps more cautious in upholding a patent for what was (in 
effect) a ‘diagnostic method’ for ‘the treatment of humans’.17  This argument is particularly 
germane where, as here, conventional measures well known in the art were employed by the 
patentee in the diagnostic process. 
Against the backdrop of the Mayo decision, the USSC once again had the opportunity to rein in 
the scope of patentable subject matter when it considered the patent eligibility of naturally 
occurring gene sequences in Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics Inc 
(‘Myriad’).18  This landmark decision saw a confluence of political, social and economic 
interests and involved issues relating to BRCA research, access to genetic testing and the 
financial viability of the biotechnology industry.  In balancing all these interests, the USSC 
                                                          
13 Ibid. at 1304. 
14 Ibid. at 1298. 
15 Ibid. at 1295 (emphasis added). 
16 Ibid. at 1297-1298. For a critique of the Mayo decision, see Christopher Holman, ‘Mayo, Myriad, and the Future 
of Innovation in Molecular Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine’ (2014) 15(4) North Carolina Journal of Law & 
Technology 639 at 666 et seq; David Taylor, ‘Confusing Patent Eligibility’, Tennessee Law Review (forthcoming) 
(paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754323). 
17 See Article 27(3)(a) of the TRIPS Agreement 1994. 
18 133 S Ct 2107 (2013). 
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ultimately rejected the patent eligibility of isolated deoxyribonucleic acid (‘DNA’) sequences 
that were naturally occurring. 
The facts in Myriad are well known and will not be set out in detail here.  Suffice to say that 
Myriad Genetics Inc (‘Myriad’) – hitherto the only commercial provider of BRCA diagnostic 
testing in the US – had successfully uncovered the precise location and nucleotide sequence of 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes (the ‘BRCA genes’), for which it obtained patent protection.  
Mutations of these genes can substantially increase the risk of contracting breast and ovarian 
cancers.  It was undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any of the genetic information 
encoded in the BRCA genes, nor did Myriad create or alter the genetic structure of DNA. 
The primary issue before the USSC was whether a naturally occurring DNA segment was patent 
eligible under §101 by virtue of its isolation from the rest of the human genome.  Notably, 
Myriad’s patent in this appeal covered product (and not method/process) claims that were 
directed to isolated DNA molecules containing the BRCA genes.19  Secondarily, the Court also 
considered the patent eligibility of synthetically created DNA known as complementary DNA 
(‘cDNA’), which contains the same protein-coding information found in a segment of natural 
DNA (i.e. exons) but omits portions within the DNA segment that do not code for proteins (i.e. 
introns). 
In reversing long-standing USPTO practice, Justice Thomas for a unanimous USSC held that 
Myriad’s patent claim for a naturally occurring DNA segment – albeit specifically isolated – fell 
squarely within the product of nature exception.20  His Honour reiterated the Court’s position in 
Mayo that ‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ were ineligible for patenting 
because they comprised the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’.21  The grant of 
patents over such subject matter would unduly ‘tie up’ the use of these tools and thereby ‘inhibit 
future innovation premised upon them’.22  Justice Thomas also acknowledged that Myriad may 
have found the precise location of an important and useful gene but groundbreaking, innovative 
or even brilliant discovery does not satisfy the §101 inquiry and render the gene a ‘new … 
composition of matter’.23 
The message here appears to be that simply isolating the requisite gene from its surrounding 
genetic material – notwithstanding that this process requires volitional ‘human intervention’ and 
the severing of covalent bonds – does not, ipso facto, amount to an act of invention.  In this 
author’s view, this must be correct because the resulting isolated DNA molecule does not, in 
                                                          
19 Myriad’s diagnostic method claims had earlier been invalidated by the Federal Circuit and were not addressed by 
the USSC: see Association for Molecular Pathology v USPTO 689 F 3d 1303 (Fed Cir 2012). 
20 Myriad at 2111. 
21 Ibid. at 2116. 
22 Ibid. This is also known as the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’: see the USSC’s subsequent decision in Alice (n 8) (at 
2354) and the Federal Circuit’s very recent decision in Rapid Litigation Management Ltd v Cellzdirect Inc No. 
2015-1570 (Fed Cir, July 5, 2016), slip op., at 16. 
23 Myriad at 2117. 
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substance, contain ‘markedly different characteristics’ from naturally occurring genetic material.  
After all, it must be borne in mind that at no point in the process of isolation did Myriad create or 
alter any of the genetic information encoded in the BRCA genes.24 
Curiously, the USSC then hinted, in passing, that the validity of Myriad’s patent claims could 
have been salvaged had they been drafted/expressed in terms of the specific ‘chemical 
composition’ of a particular molecule.  Instead, the claims as filed were concerned primarily with 
the ‘information’ contained in the genetic sequence.25  In other words, the outcome of the Myriad 
litigation may well have been different if the disputed claims had not focused solely on the 
genetic information encoded in the isolated BRCA genes (which is identical to the information 
found in the in vivo gene sequence) but instead relied on the chemical changes resulting from the 
isolation of a particular segment of DNA (namely, the severing of the covalent bonds that bind 
gene molecules together and the creation of a new, chemically distinct molecule).26 
This implicit qualification by the USSC therefore suggests that how patent claims are drafted and 
filed may well have an impact on the patent eligibility or otherwise of the claimed subject matter.  
Crucially, to better defend patents against attacks of invalidity, the patentee should ensure that 
the claims in question have been drafted with sufficient specificity and transformation so as to 
evidence how and why the invention as claimed is ‘markedly different’ from the underlying, 
naturally occurring material. 
For completeness, it should be mentioned that the USSC did find cDNA patent eligible under 
§101 because cDNA, unlike a naturally occurring, isolated DNA segment, is not a product of 
nature since ‘the lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made’.27 
In trying to rationalise this decision which invalidated the product claims in Myriad’s patents, 
this author postulates that the USSC was mindful – were it to reach the opposite conclusion – to 
not indirectly extend patent protection to the underlying diagnostic processes/methods employed 
by Myriad for detecting genetic mutations in patients and assessing their breast/ovarian cancer 
                                                          
24 See also Luigi Palombi, ‘The Patenting of Biological Materials in the United States: A State of Policy Confusion’ 
(2015) 23(1) Perspectives on Science 35 at 56-57. Contra as to the reasons why it has been argued that DNA 
isolated from its natural cellular environment or otherwise produced in the laboratory is not structurally and 
functionally identical to that existing in nature, see Andrea Stazi, Biotechnological Inventions and Patentability of 
Life (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) at 277. 
25 Myriad at 2118. 
26 With respect, it is difficult to see how, on the facts in Myriad, the USSC could have reached a different conclusion 
as regards patent eligibility if Myriad were to have drafted its claims with reference to the chemical changes 
resulting from the isolation process. This is because even though the act of severing the covalent bonds that bind 
gene molecules together does require human intervention, the resulting isolated DNA molecule is not, in substance, 
‘markedly different’ from naturally occurring genetic material. Cf. D’Arcy at [6] and [86] et seq. 
27 Myriad at 2119 – although the USSC did qualify itself in regard to a ‘very short series of DNA [that] may have no 
intervening introns to remove when creating cDNA’ because ‘a short strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable from 
natural DNA’ (Ibid.). For a comment on the inconsistency in the USSC’s treatment of the patent eligibility of 
cDNA, see Peter Lee, ‘The Supreme Court’s Myriad Effects on Scientific Research: Definitional Fluidity and the 
Legal Construction of Nature’ (2015) 5(5) UC Irvine Law Review 1077 at 1106-1107. 
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risk.28  Indeed, on the basis of its product patents, Myriad enjoyed exclusive rights to all clinical 
diagnostic tests for detecting breast and ovarian cancer in the US because ‘isolation is necessary 
to conduct genetic testing’.29  Invalidating Myriad’s patents would therefore serve the larger 
public interest, given that other medical practitioners would then be able – on a competitive basis 
– to isolate the BRCA genes for purposes of diagnostic testing.30  There is therefore much to be 
said for eliminating broad patent monopolies (particularly on products of nature for which no 
substitute exists) in the field of genetic diagnostic testing. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the Myriad decision was truly unprecedented.31  
Commentators have since sought to confine its holding to the specific facts of the case,32 so that 
the decision ‘should have little if any impact on genetic testing or biotechnology in general’.33  
Yet another has observed that although the result reached by the USSC ‘… is not particularly 
doctrinally or scientifically rigorous, especially in its imprecise distinctions between isolated 
DNA and cDNA’,34 the Myriad decision remains ‘… a highly pragmatic opinion that bends 
doctrine and science to achieve a political and legal compromise’.35  Going forward, whether or 
not Myriad will have any significant impact on the future of genetic/biomedical research, 
biotechnological innovation and patient access to diagnostic testing are questions to which we 
shall return later in this paper. 
Post-Myriad, lower courts in the US continue to grapple with this decision and, indeed, with 
Mayo as well.  For instance, In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh),36 the US Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit addressed the patent eligibility of clones under §101.  Here, ‘Dolly the Sheep’ 
and other mammals had been cloned using the somatic method, a process which the court 
described as ‘a breakthrough in scientific discovery’.37  Unfortunately, as in Myriad, the claims 
at issue in this case concerned specific products (i.e. Dolly and other clones) and were not 
                                                          
28 Contrary to Article 27(3)(a) of TRIPS. Cf. D’Arcy at [8] (and elsewhere), discussed below. 
29 Myriad at 2114. As Justice Thomas astutely put it, ‘Myriad thus solidified its position as the only entity providing 
BRCA testing’ (Ibid.). 
30 Tina Saladno, ‘Seeing the Forest Through the Trees: Gene Patents & the Reality of the Commons’ (2011) 26 
Berkeley Tech LJ 301. 
31 Mark Ratner, ‘Myriad decision aftershocks ripple through biotech’ (2013) 31(8) Nature Biotechnology 663. 
32 See, e.g., Chester Moore, Susan McBee and Wolfgang Flasche, ‘The USPTO Guidance in response to Myriad 
runs counter to Supreme Court precedent and the TRIPS Agreement’ (2015) 10(2) JIPLP 115 at 118 (arguing that 
the holding in Myriad should be confined only to subject matter in which structure and function are so intertwined as 
to be inseparable); Christopher Holman (n 16) at 652 (suggesting that Myriad’s holding be ‘… limited to DNA that 
has literally been isolated from a natural source, thereby effectively maintaining the status quo with respect to 
synthetic copies of genomic DNA’). 
33 Christopher Holman (n 16) at 652. 
34 The criticism essentially is this – that although the removal of introns from natural DNA and the synthesis of 
cDNA in a laboratory results in an artificially created product (by the lab technician), the point remains that the 
genetic information contained in a cDNA molecule codes for a protein that is functionally and structurally identical 
to natural DNA. See Luigi Palombi, ‘Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics (US) and D’Arcy v 
Myriad Genetics (AU): Are Gene Patents in Europe a Threatened Species?’ (2016) 38 EIPR 231 at 235. 
35 Peter Lee (n 27) at 1112. 
36 750 F 3d 1333 (Fed Cir 2014). 
37 Ibid. at 1334. 
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directed to the process of cloning per se (which the Federal Circuit suggested, in passing, to be 
sufficiently meritorious). 
Despite arguments to the effect that the clones were the ‘product of human ingenuity’ and not 
‘nature’s handiwork’, Judge Dyk (for a unanimous court) held that Roslin’s product claims were 
patent ineligible as the clones shared exact genetic identity with their (naturally occurring) donor 
mammals and thus did not possess ‘markedly different characteristics from the donor mammals 
of which they [were] copies’.38  In rigidly applying Myriad’s holding to the facts at hand, the 
court opined that Roslin ‘did not create or alter any of the genetic information’ of its clones, nor 
did Roslin ‘create or alter the genetic structure of [the] DNA’ used to make its clones.39  The 
cloned mammals were therefore considered products of nature and hence patent ineligible. 
To be fair, the Federal Circuit did leave open the possibility that Roslin’s clones could have 
satisfied the patent eligibility threshold if its claims had been drafted in reference to the 
following: differences in mitochondrial DNA as well as phenotypic differences between the 
clones and their donor mammals.40  This is reminiscent of the USSC’s implicit suggestion that 
had Myriad’s claims been drafted with reference to changes in ‘chemical composition’ arising 
from the gene isolation process, the outcome of that decision may well have been different.41  
These cases clearly demonstrate the importance placed by US courts on how the proper drafting 
of claims can potentially salvage the patentability of the claimed subject matter, especially if 
derived from nature. 
Another Federal Circuit judgment rendered by Judge Dyk (again on behalf of a unanimous court) 
soon followed in University of Utah Research Foundation v Ambry Genetics Corporation.42  
This case concerned patents held by Myriad covering, inter alia, composition of matter claims 
that were directed to isolated DNA primers (which are short, synthetic, single-stranded DNA 
molecules) derived from naturally occurring genomic DNA.  Ambry Genetics was a company 
that sold medical kits designed to test for the presence of gene mutations linked to breast and 
ovarian cancer.  Myriad sued for patent infringement but the US District Court for the District of 
Utah denied its motion for a preliminary injunction.43  Its appeal was also dismissed. 
Applying Myriad, the Federal Circuit held that the claimed DNA primers – albeit synthetically 
replicated – were ‘structurally identical to the ends of DNA strands found in nature’44 and hence 
recited patent ineligible subject matter.  Another challenge facing Myriad’s primers was that they 
                                                          
38 Ibid. at 1339. 
39 Ibid. at 1337. 
40 Ibid. at 1338-1339. 
41 Myriad at 2118. 
42 774 F 3d 755 (Fed Cir 2014). 
43 3 F Supp 3d 1213 (D Utah 2014). 
44 774 F 3d 755 at 760 (Fed Cir 2014). 
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did not perform a significantly new function from their original function in nature.  In short, the 
claims at issue were essentially to products of nature.45 
More recently, the USSC’s Mayo precedent took centre stage in the Federal Circuit’s 
deliberations in Ariosa Diagnostics Inc v Sequenom Inc (‘Ariosa’).46  The patent at issue in 
Ariosa (‘the ’540 patent’) was based on the discovery by two researchers that the blood of 
pregnant women contained cell-free fetal DNA (‘cffDNA’) which could be used to make non-
invasive prenatal diagnosis of certain fetal characteristics (such as gender) through the detection 
of paternally-inherited cffDNA.  Sequenom was licensed to commercialise these prenatal 
diagnostic tests.  The primary issue in this appeal concerned the validity of the ’540 patent which 
claimed certain methods of using cffDNA. 
In applying the USSC’s guidance in Mayo and affirming the decision of the US District Court for 
the Northern District of California, Judge Reyna for the Federal Circuit invalidated the ’540 
patent under § 101 on the basis that its prenatal diagnostic method claims were not directed to 
patent eligible subject matter. 
Although the court acknowledged that detecting cffDNA in maternal blood samples that other 
researchers had previously discarded as waste material was a positive, valuable and even ground-
breaking contribution to science, the fact remained that the claims in question concerned a 
multistep method that began and ended with a ‘natural phenomenon’ (namely, the discovery of 
the presence of cffDNA in maternal blood).47  Further, the claimed diagnostic method – 
involving the steps of amplifying and detecting cffDNA – essentially employed ‘well-
understood, routine and conventional’ laboratory techniques.48  It was consequently decided that 
because the claims at issue were directed to matter that is ‘naturally occurring’, the ’540 patent 
had to be invalidated on the authority of Mayo.49 
Unsurprisingly, this decision has generated considerable debate.  It may be usefully noted that 
unlike the patent in suit in Myriad, the diagnostic method patent in Ariosa did not claim the 
naturally occurring cffDNA per se.  Arguably, the claims were directed at the practical 
application of (and amounted to something ‘more’ than simply disclosing) the underlying natural 
phenomenon – namely a new diagnostic method of using cffDNA to achieve a practical result 
and benefit not previously attained. 
                                                          
45 Separately, the Federal Circuit also found Myriad’s diagnostic method claims (involving comparisons between 
‘wild-type’ sequences and a patient’s own genetic sequences) patent ineligible for reciting ‘abstract ideas’ after 
applying the two-step analysis in Alice (n 8) (at 2355). The court did not find it necessary to consider the Mayo 
precedent. 
46 788 F 3d 1371 (Fed Cir 2015). 
47 Ibid. at 1376. 
48 Ibid. at 1377. 
49 See also the concurring opinion delivered by Judge Linn, where his Honour expressed concern that the Mayo 
decision was too ‘sweeping’ (Ibid. at 1380). Indeed, but for the Mayo precedent, the judge saw no reason – in policy 
or statute – why this ‘meritorious’ and ‘breakthrough’ invention was undeserving of patent protection. 
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One potentially far-reaching (and ‘perhaps unintended’)50 consequence of the Mayo decision – as 
well as its stringent application on the facts in Ariosa – is that it is now far more risky and 
uncertain for biotechnology companies to seek patent protection for molecular diagnostics and 
personalised medicine.  Undoubtedly, the availability of method claims for diagnostic 
applications provides significant incentives for continued investment in this field of bio-scientific 
endeavour.51  The future of innovation in diagnostic testing and therapeutic methods in the US 
therefore appears fairly bleak, at least for the moment.52 
Alas, such pessimistic sentiment lingers on with the recent denial by a majority of the Federal 
Circuit (11-1) of Sequenom’s petition for a rehearing en banc of the Ariosa decision.53  On 2 
December 2015, Judge Lourie (joined by Judge Moore) expressed the view that but for the Mayo 
precedent which was indistinguishable and hence binding,54 the diagnostic method claims in 
question did not per se recite laws of nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas.  The multistep 
method of amplifying genetic material to detect cffDNA in maternal blood did require some 
degree of ‘human intervention’.55  His Honour felt that it was ‘unsound’ to have a rule – 
implicitly referring to the holding in Mayo – that took inventions of this nature out of the realm 
of patent eligibility.56  On the other hand, what was truly objectionable about Sequenom’s ’540 
patent, which Judge Lourie alluded to, concerned the breadth of the claims (that ‘they may be 
indefinite or too broad’), and not their eligibility.57 
The latest development in this saga concerned Sequenom’s filing of a writ of certiorari with the 
USSC on 21 March 2016, whereby the apex court was asked to provide clarification on the limits 
of §101 (particularly as it relates to the patent eligibility of diagnostic tests).58  Given the present 
judicial climate in the US of what appears to be an almost blanket prohibition against diagnostic 
                                                          
50 Ibid., per Judge Linn. 
51 See, generally, Christopher Holman (n 32); Christopher Holman, ‘The Critical Role of Patents in the 
Development, Commercialization and Utilization of Innovative Genetic Diagnostic Tests and Personalized 
Medicine’ (2015) 21(2) Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 297; Anna Laakmann, ‘The New 
Genomic Semicommons’ (2015) 5(5) UC Irvine Law Review 1001. 
52 One commentator has lamented that ‘diagnostic technology’ was no longer patent eligible: see Rebecca 
Eisenberg, ‘Diagnostics Need Not Apply’ (2015) 21(2) Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 
256 at 285. It has also been argued that the decision in Ariosa could potentially ‘upend patent protection for a critical 
field of scientific research’ and ‘set the patent system on a dire course’: see the amicus brief by Jeffrey Lefstin and 
Peter Menell, ‘Don’t Throw Out Fetal-Diagnostic Innovation with the Bathwater: Why Ariosa v Sequenom is an 
Ideal Vehicle for Constructing a Sound Patent-Eligibility Framework’ (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652452) at 4. 
53 Ariosa Diagnostics Inc v Sequenom Inc Nos. 2014-1139, 2014-1144 (Fed Cir, December 2, 2015). 
54 A view also shared by Judge Dyk who wrote a separate, concurring opinion. However, in writing the sole dissent, 
Judge Newman disagreed that the Mayo and Myriad precedents were binding on the court, saying that the facts in 
Ariosa – an incorrect decision in her view – were clearly distinguishable. 
55 Ariosa Diagnostics Inc v Sequenom Inc Nos. 2014-1139, 2014-1144 (Fed Cir, December 2, 2015), slip op., at 5. 
56 Ibid., slip op., at 7. 
57 Ibid., slip op., at 4-5. Judge Dyk opined likewise – Ibid., slip op., at 9-10. Cf. similar views expressed in D’Arcy at 
[8], [14], [66], [67], [70] and [154]. 
58 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sequenom Inc v Ariosa Diagnostics Inc No. 15-1182 (March 21, 2016). 
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method patents,59 this petition would have presented the USSC with a timely opportunity to 
revisit Mayo and provide much-needed guidance to the lower courts on the ambit of the patent 
eligibility test set forth therein.  After all, as Judge Lourie plainly conceded, ‘[i]t is … said that a 
crisis of patent law and medical innovation may be upon us, and there seems to be some truth in 
that concern’.60  Regrettably, the USSC refused to grant certiorari,61 therefore leaving 
undisturbed the Federal Circuit’s invalidation of Sequenom’s ’540 patent and the continuing 
‘crisis’ in this area of patent law. 
Going forward, it seems quite clear that the availability in the US of gene patents as well as 
patents for gene-based diagnostic methods has been sharply curtailed. 
2.2 Canada 
Before leaving the present analysis of the US position, brief mention should be made of a patent 
eligibility test case – on issues and arguments similar to those in the Mayo and Myriad decisions 
– that could have received judicial consideration in Canada. 
On 3 November 2014, the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario initiated proceedings before 
the Canadian Federal Court against the University of Utah Research Foundation, alleging, inter 
alia, that the university’s 5 Long QT patents62 claim patent ineligible subject matter and 
therefore ought to be invalidated.63  Owing to the Long QT patents held by the university, it was 
alleged that hospitals and laboratories in Ontario were unable to conduct on-site genetic testing 
for Long QT and had to utilise testing services from licensed laboratories in the US.  This, 
according to the Statement of Claim, meant that these hospitals and laboratories were prevented 
from developing the institutional capability to properly diagnose Long QT mutations in Ontario 
patients and from building the first repository in Canada of genetic information on Long QT 
(which would in turn improve diagnosis and treatment). 
                                                          
59 For a recent example, see the Federal Circuit’s decision in Genetic Technologies Ltd v Merial LLC 18 F 3d 1369 
(Fed Cir 2016) where the patent in suit – relating to methods of analysing DNA sequences and detecting genetic 
variations – was also invalidated on the authority of Mayo/Alice. It does, however, appear that the patent eligibility 
of method claims covering non-DNA related, biotech subject matter is much more promising in the US. For 
example, the Federal Circuit, in overturning the district court, very recently upheld the patent eligibility of process 
claims which revealed how a fraction of hepatocytes (a type of liver cell) could survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles 
– claims which the Federal Circuit felt were not simply ‘directed to’, nor did they pre-empt, a patent ineligible law 
of nature but were instead directed to ‘a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepatocytes’ for later 
use: see Rapid Litigation Management Ltd v Cellzdirect Inc No. 2015-1570 (Fed Cir, July 5, 2016), slip op., at 8-10. 
60 Ariosa Diagnostics Inc v Sequenom Inc Nos. 2014-1139, 2014-1144 (Fed Cir, December 2, 2015), slip op., at 4. 
61 Ariosa Diagnostics Inc v Sequenom Inc 788 F 3d 1371 (Fed Cir 2015), reh'g en banc denied, (Fed Cir, December 
2, 2015), cert. denied, No. 15-1102, 2016 WL 1117246 (June 27, 2016). 
62 Long QT syndrome is an inherited cardiac disorder in humans. 
63 Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario v Transgenomic Inc (14 May 2015), T-2249-14 (FCTD). The full story is 
available at 
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/11/03/gene_patent_lawsuit_aims_to_clear_up_confusion_in_canada.html. 
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The disputing parties, however, managed to reach an out-of-court settlement on 9 March 2016,64 
pursuant to which the patentee would allow all Canadian public sector hospitals and laboratories 
to test Canadian patients for Long QT syndrome on a not-for-profit basis.65  This outcome is 
certainly to be celebrated because, whilst the patents in question remain valid and enforceable 
against all commercial uses and for-profit exploitation by commercial entities, non-profit 
diagnostic testing for Long QT syndrome is now more accessible to the Canadian public – i.e. 
cheaper and faster access.  Indeed, this happy compromise reached in Canada may well serve as 
a possible way forward and model for other countries like the US (as earlier discussed) and 
Australia, to which our attention now turns. 
2.3 Australia 
Under Australian law, the change(s) inherent in the resulting subject matter must, for purposes of 
patent eligibility, amount to a ‘manner of manufacture’ within the meaning of section 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies 1623.66 This provision, as interpreted by the Australian High Court in 
National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (‘NRDC’),67  requires 
there to be a human intervention that results in an ‘artificially created state of affairs’ of 
economic utility/significance.  Only then can it be said that there is a ‘patentable invention’ 
within the meaning of section 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
The validity of Myriad’s BRCA gene patents was also challenged in Australia on almost 
identical facts and was, at first instance, upheld by Justice Nicholas in Cancer Voices Australia v 
Myriad Genetics Inc.68  On appeal, a unanimous Full Court of 5 judges in D’Arcy v Myriad 
Genetics Inc affirmed Justice Nicholas’ decision and likewise endorsed the patent eligibility of 
claims covering naturally occurring nucleic acid that had been isolated as well as cDNA.69 
Unlike the USSC, the Full Court was of the view that each of Myriad’s claims was to an isolated 
chemical compound (i.e. a product) and not to genetic information per se.  Indeed, the analysis 
focused on the specific chemical composition of each particular molecule, rather than on the 
information contained in the genetic sequence.70  It was ultimately decided that there was human 
intervention by Myriad to the extent that the isolated nucleic acid, having been removed from its 
natural environment in vivo, was different in chemical composition from its original state in the 
human body (therein lay the requisite ‘artificial state of affairs’).  In other words, the claimed 
                                                          
64 See the press release at http://www.cheo.on.ca/en/gene-patents. 
65 See the settlement agreement at http://www.cheo.on.ca/uploads/genetics/Gene%20patent/CHEO-Transgenomic-
Settlement-Agreement-Signed-2016-03-08.PDF. 
66 21 Jac I c 3. 
67 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 276-277. See also D’Arcy at [6]. 
68 (2013) 99 IPR 567; [2013] FCA 65 (Federal Court of Australia). 
69 (2014) 313 ALR 627; [2014] FCAFC 115 (Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia; enlarged bench of 5 
judges). For a critique of the Full Court’s decision, see Jessica Lai, ‘Gene-related Patents in Australia and New 
Zealand: Taking a Step Back’ (2015) 25 AIPJ 181. 
70 (2014) 313 ALR 627; [2014] FCAFC 115 at [216]. 
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invention was ‘chemically, structurally and functionally different’ from subject matter found in 
nature and hence patent eligible.71 
It should also be mentioned that the outcomes reached at first instance and by the Full Court – in 
upholding the patent eligibility of Myriad’s isolated gene sequences – appear to be fully 
compatible with Australia’s legislative history, parliamentary intent as well as the Australian 
Law Reform Commission report on gene patenting.72  Pertinently, the Australian Senate had 
specifically rejected an amendment to the Patents Bill 1990 which would have excluded genes 
(whether derived from cells or chemically synthesised) from the scope of patentable subject 
matter.73 
Be that as it may, the High Court of Australia (‘HCA’), perhaps somewhat surprisingly, roundly 
overturned the Full Court’s decision in 3 separate (but unanimous) judgments in D’Arcy v 
Myriad Genetics Inc (‘D’Arcy’).74  Similar to its fate in the US, Myriad’s patent in suit – 
specifically claims 1, 2 and 3 of Australian Patent No. 686004 – was consequently invalidated. 
In deciding whether claims 1-3 of Myriad’s patent disclosed a ‘patentable invention’ within the 
meaning of section 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (i.e. a ‘manner of manufacture’ within 
the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623), the majority judgment led by 
French CJ (and joined by Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) repeatedly emphasised that Myriad’s 
claimed invention – albeit expressed as a class of product (i.e. chemical compounds) in ‘form’ – 
was, in ‘substance’, concerned with information embodied in the BRCA gene sequences.75  As 
such, the claims were not patent eligible because no human intervention was involved on 
Myriad’s part in simply discovering the existence of (naturally occurring) genetic information.76  
This conclusion – which is diametrically opposed to the outcome reached by the Full Court 
below77 – is generally in keeping with the views expressed by the USSC in the corresponding US 
decision.78 
                                                          
71 Ibid. at [194]; see also [155] and [212]. 
72 Ibid. at [156] et seq. The report is titled ‘Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health (ALRC Report 
99)’ and was published on 30 August 2004: see http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-99. 
73 Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 September 1990 at 2478-2482. Further, in late 2010, a 
Private Members’ Bill – which sought to exclude ‘biological materials … which are identical or substantially 
identical to such materials as they exist in nature’ from patentability – did not pass the Australian Senate, following 
a recommendation made by the majority in the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee: see 
Australia, Senate, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Patent Amendment (Human Genes and 
Biological Materials) Bill 2010, (2011) at [5.25]-[5.26]. 
74 [2015] HCA 35. 
75 Ibid. at [6] and [86] et seq (especially at [89]). See also [145]. 
76 Ibid. at [6] (‘The information is not “made” by human action. It is discerned.’). Similar views were shared by 
Gageler and Nettle JJ at [134] and [136], as well as by Gordon J in her sole-authored judgment at [248] and [282]. 
77 According to the HCA, the Full Court’s conclusion was based upon a premise which ‘[elevated] form over 
substance to the detriment of the developmental function entrusted to the Court …’ (Ibid. at [88]). 
78 ‘That characterisation [by the USSC in Myriad], so far as it emphasises the focus of the claims on genetic 
information, is applicable to the claims in this case and, contrary to the view of the Full Court, should be accepted’ 
(Ibid. at [90]). 
14 
 
The quartet of judges, who declared that Australia’s legislative history was of no assistance to 
the court,79 seemed particularly concerned that Myriad’s claimed invention fell within a novel 
category of inventions or, in their words, a ‘new class of claim’80 involving ‘unimagined 
technologies with unimagined characteristics and implications’.81  Recognising the ‘limits of 
judicial law-making inherent in common law methodology’, their Honours opined that ‘[w]here 
an affirmative application of the concept [‘manner of manufacture’] is likely to result in the 
creation of important rights as against the world, to involve far-reaching questions of public 
policy and to affect the balance of important conflicting interests, the question must be asked 
whether that application is best left for legislative determination’.82  The HCA’s message here is 
that courts should leave it to Parliament to make such policy decisions, particularly in 
legitimising the patent eligibility of inventions of this nature (such as Myriad’s isolated gene 
sequences).83 
On a related note, the joint majority judgment also took issue with the breadth of Myriad’s 
claims/monopoly.84  It was observed that the relevant claims were broad enough to include the 
application of ‘any process, known or unknown,’ for isolating a patient’s DNA sequence and 
were not delineated by ‘a limiting range of chemical formulae’.85  This also led their Honours to 
proclaim that the ‘size of the class of the products as defined [was] large’ with ‘[n]o upper limit 
… suggested in argument’.86  There was therefore ‘a real risk that the chilling effect of the 
claims, on the use of any isolation process in relation to the BRCA1 gene, would lead to the 
creation of an exorbitant and unwarranted de facto monopoly on all methods of isolating nucleic 
acids containing the sequences coding for the BRCA1 protein’.87  Finally, their Honours also 
noted that ‘[t]he infringement of the formal monopoly would not be ascertainable until the 
mutations and polymorphisms were detected’ and that ‘[s]uch a result would be at odds with the 
purposes of the patent system’.88 
                                                          
79 Ibid. at [37]. See also [171]. 
80 Ibid. at [5] and [28]. 
81 Ibid. at [23]. 
82 Ibid. at [7] (emphasis added). See also [23], [25], [28] and [94]. 
83 Query though whether this line of reasoning is persuasive as it may equally be argued that the HCA, after 
adopting a quasi-legislative approach to questions of (in this case, non-) patentable subject matter, had itself strayed 
into territory that typically would be regarded as the province of the Legislature? Indeed, it is Parliament that 
normally decides what constitutes non-patentable subject matter: see, e.g., the list of non-inventions found in Article 
52(2) EPC 2000 and section 1(2) UK Patents Act 1977, as well as the exclusion of methods of treatment and 
diagnostic methods in Article 53(c) EPC 2000 and section 4A(1) UK Patents Act 1977 (as amended in 2004). Cf. 
also the Full Court’s dicta on this issue – (2014) 313 ALR 627; [2014] FCAFC 115 at [205]. 
84 Cf. the sentiments expressed by Judge Lourie and Judge Dyk in relation to the breath of Sequenom’s claims in 
Ariosa Diagnostics Inc v Sequenom Inc Nos. 2014-1139, 2014-1144 (Fed Cir, December 2, 2015), slip op., at 4-5 
and 9-12, respectively. 
85 D’Arcy at [8]. 
86 Ibid. See also [14], [66], [67], [70] and [154]. A similar view was expressed by Gordon J at [241]-[242]. 
87 Ibid. at [8] (emphasis added). See also [28] and [29]. 
88 Ibid. at [8], citing William Cornish, David Llewelyn & Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, 
Trade Marks and Allied Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2013) at [21-21]. Gordon J also had similar reservations 
at [260]. 
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Perhaps, then, the underlying objection surrounding the issue of patent eligibility is that Myriad’s 
claims, as drafted, cover too broad (and hence too indefinite) a monopoly, and this is also likely 
to result in difficult questions concerning infringement.  One of the reasons for this, as was also 
pointed out by Gageler and Nettle JJ in their joint judgment, is that whilst Myriad’s claim 1 was 
to a product (in form), it was, in substance, a ‘‟disguised” process claim’.89  In other words, 
Myriad’s patent (claimed formally as a product) gave it the sole right, in substance and effect, to 
isolate the BRCA genes – using any method/process (well-understood and long-established 
methods included)90 – for (conventional) diagnostic testing purposes.  It could well have been 
this policy consideration that ultimately influenced the outcome of the HCA’s decision.91  As 
Gordon J aptly summed up: 
Those consequences demonstrate that if claim 1 is valid it would extend the concept of 
what is patentable subject matter …, and the limits of the monopoly that would be 
granted, too far.92 
The other joint judgment rendered by Gageler and Nettle JJ adopted a slightly different approach 
to determining the question of patent eligibility.  Although their Honours also reached the same 
conclusion that Myriad’s claims were patent ineligible, they took the view that for an invention 
to qualify as a ‘manner of manufacture’ under the statute, it had to be ‘something more than a 
mere discovery’93 and to also satisfy the ‘threshold requirement’ of inventiveness.94  This 
threshold requirement of inventiveness (or the search for an ‘inventive concept’)95 is to be 
understood and examined as a concept that is ‘separate and distinct’ from the other requirements 
of patentability, namely novelty and inventive step.96  On this basis, it was decided that although 
Myriad’s isolation of nucleic acid comprising the BRCA1 gene was a man-made process, it did 
not involve any element of inventiveness.  Rather, it was ‘no more than the application of a 
recognised diagnostic technique to a known purpose of examining fragments of human DNA’.97 
                                                          
89 D’Arcy at [145]. 
90 Ibid. at [121], [138], [146] and [157]. 
91 Ibid. at [93]. As noted by Gageler and Nettle JJ at [160], ‘… far from being a claim for a manner of manufacture 
of isolated nucleic acid constituted of the mutated BRCA1 gene, claim 1 is in truth a claim for a monopoly over the 
right to apply long-established methods for the isolation and amplification of specific nucleotide fragments to the 
isolation and amplification of a patient's naturally occurring BRCA1 gene …’ (emphasis added). And Gordon J’s 
concern was expressed thus at [260]: ‘… if claim 1 is valid, it will in practice prevent isolation and testing of the 
BRCA1 gene even if a researcher or medical practitioner is diagnostically testing for a purpose unrelated to 
detection of predisposition to one of the identified cancers. Not only that, Myriad would have an exclusive right to 
isolate the nucleic acid without having claimed the process of isolation’ (emphasis added). Cf. also the concerns 
raised in this report: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA (London, July 2002) at [5.57]-
[5.62]. 
92 D’Arcy at [261]. 
93 Ibid. at [126] (emphasis added). In other words, the subject matter of the claim(s) must be ‘sufficiently artificial’ 
or ‘different from nature’ (Ibid. at [127]). 
94 Ibid. at [129] and [131]. 
95 Ibid. at [128]. 
96 Ibid. at [131]. 
97 Ibid. at [161]. 
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Their Honours’ repeated emphasis on the discovery-invention distinction in their determination 
of patentable subject matter98 is reminiscent of the judicial approach adopted in the US through 
the laws/products of nature exception.99  In addition, it is worth pointing out that the threshold 
requirement of inventiveness, which lies at the heart of what constitutes an ‘invention’, also 
accords with the principles – in particular, the two-step test – articulated by the USSC in its 
recent decision in Alice Corp Pty Ltd v CLS Bank Int’l (‘Alice’).100 
To sum up, it may be said that Myriad’s Australian patent was doubly ‘defective’.  Having made 
an outright discovery of the BRCA genes and then proceeded to file a product claim for it (which 
was found by the HCA to be a claim, in substance, to naturally occurring genetic information and 
hence devoid of human intervention/inventiveness), Myriad was also (perhaps insidiously) trying 
to lay claim to a method(s) of diagnosis – for detecting the increased likelihood of BRCA 
malignancy – which generally employed well-known and long-established techniques of 
isolation and amplification (what the HCA termed as a ‘disguised’ process claim of very broad 
and indefinite scope).  Accordingly, the relevant claims did not disclose a ‘manner of 
manufacture’ and hence did not recite patent eligible subject matter.  Note, however, that whilst 
Myriad’s product claims in D’Arcy were declared patent ineligible, the joint majority judgment 
did clarify that the HCA holding was to be confined to the specific claims in dispute (i.e. claims 
1-3) and did not extend to gene patenting generally.101  Further, this decision did not in any way 
undermine the validity of Myriad’s other claims in the patent, such as its diagnostic method 
claims.102  Indeed, the judicial attitude in Australia towards the patent eligibility of diagnostic 
method claims appears to be more promising, with the HCA having confirmed recently the 
validity of claims for methods of medical treatment of the human body.103  As French CJ 
emphatically declared in Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd, ‘[t]he exclusion from 
patentability of methods of medical treatment represents an anomaly for which no clear and 
consistent foundation has been enunciated’.104 
2.4 Summary – comparing the US and Australian positions 
Although the USSC and HCA both arrived at the same conclusion vis-à-vis the patent 
ineligibility of naturally occurring DNA sequences that have been specifically isolated, there are 
possibly three aspects of the Australian decision which sets it apart from the corresponding US 
judgment. 
                                                          
98 Ibid. at [165]: ‘A manner of new manufacture necessitates invention …’. Gordon J also emphasised thus at [219]. 
99 See Brad Sherman, ‘D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc: Patenting Genes in Australia’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 
135 at 141. 
100 134 S Ct 2347 at 2355 (2014). 
101 D’Arcy at [37]. 
102 Ibid. at [168]. 
103 See Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 253 CLR 284; [2013] HCA 50. In a 4-1 decision, 
the HCA affirmed the patent eligibility of a claim for a method of using a known drug, leflunomide (hitherto used to 
treat rheumatoid arthritis and psoriatic arthritis), to prevent or treat a skin disorder, psoriasis (a hitherto unknown 
therapeutic use). Note, however, the caveat left open by Justices Crennan and Kiefel at [287]. 
104 Ibid. at [50]. 
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First, Myriad’s product claims for isolated BRCA gene sequences were denied patent eligibility 
by both the USSC and HCA, even though there were differences in the statutory language and 
drafting of the respective claims.  It is submitted that the two apex courts arrived at the correct 
conclusion in this respect, particularly when regard is given to the fact that Myriad did not – in 
the process of gene isolation – create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the 
BRCA genes, nor did Myriad create or alter the genetic structure of DNA. 
In the US, protection was denied on the basis that the relevant claims – which focused solely on 
the genetic information encoded in the isolated genes rather than drafted with reference to the 
chemical changes resulting from such isolation – were directed at products of nature (thereby 
falling within one of the judicially-recognised exceptions to patent eligibility) and therefore did 
not contain markedly different characteristics from subject matter found in nature.  Similarly, in 
Australia, the claims did not disclose a manner of manufacture (or an artificially created state of 
affairs) because the HCA took the view that they were, in substance, directed at genetic 
information per se (which is naturally occurring). 
Nonetheless, it is suggested that the HCA appears to have adopted a stricter approach to 
determining the question of patent eligibility, given that the various High Court justices – in 
carefully scrutinising the inherent character of Myriad’s claimed subject matter – were mindful 
not to let ‘form’ trump ‘substance’ insofar as the art of claim construction was concerned.  The 
USSC, on the other hand, appears to have left open the possibility of a different outcome had 
Myriad drafted and filed its claims differently.  It has already been pointed out earlier in this 
paper that it is difficult to see how, on the facts in Myriad, the USSC could have reached a 
different conclusion as regards patent eligibility if Myriad were to have drafted its claims with 
reference to the chemical changes resulting from the isolation process.105 
Second, it is apparent that the HCA was wholly cognisant of the policy ramifications that 
upholding Myriad’s patent in suit would have entailed and was therefore intent on reining in the 
breadth of Myriad’s monopoly.  The potential reach of Myriad’s claims – though drafted as 
product claims in form but were, in substance, ‘disguised’ process claims – did not appear to 
have been contemplated by the USSC (at least overtly). 
Finally, the HCA was comparatively more ambivalent as regards the fate of cDNA – i.e. 
synthetic (exons-only) DNA created in the laboratory.  It is, however, reasonable to suggest that 
for the following reasons, their Honours appear to have adopted a far stricter view (most 
probably resulting in denial) of the patent eligibility of cDNA than their counterparts did in the 
USSC (who hold the view that cDNA is, save in one limited respect, clearly patentable subject 
matter). 
First, it is common ground that Myriad’s patent in suit contained 30 claims but the validity of 
only claims 1-3 was challenged before the HCA.  According to the majority view led by French 
                                                          
105 See note 26, above. 
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CJ, each of these claims relates to ‘an isolated nucleic acid’ – a term which ‘embraces a nucleic 
acid sequence or protein removed from its naturally occurring environment and includes 
recombinant or cloned DNA isolates and chemically synthesised analogs or analogs biologically 
synthesised by heterologous systems’.106  ‘Heterologous systems’, in turn, ‘appear to refer to 
biomolecular processes outside the naturally occurring environment of the nucleic acid from 
which the isolate is prepared’.107  These definitions suggest that cDNA – which is synthesised in 
the laboratory – also falls within the ambit of Myriad’s disputed claims, being ‘chemically 
synthesised analogs or analogs biologically synthesised by heterologous systems’.  Since claims 
1-3 were invalidated by the HCA for want of patentable subject matter, it must follow that 
cDNA, as covered by the claims, is also patent ineligible subject matter. 
Second, it was observed by the majority that Myriad’s disputed claims ‘encompass molecules 
comprising isolated nucleic acids containing coding nucleotides [i.e. exons] arranged in the same 
sequence as appears in the DNA from which they were derived, whether or not introns and other 
non-coding sections have been removed from the relevant stretch of that DNA’.108  This suggests 
that in cases where introns have indeed been removed from the isolated DNA sequence in the 
laboratory (thereby creating cDNA), the resulting chemical compound nevertheless contains – in 
substance – the same information as does naturally occurring DNA in vivo from which it was 
derived.  As such, without further evidence of human intervention resulting in an artificially 
created state of affairs of economic utility, Myriad’s claims covering cDNA do not satisfy the 
requirement of a ‘manner of manufacture’ and hence must also be treated as patent ineligible. 
Perhaps the clearest indication of cDNA’s patent ineligibility in Australia stems from the 
following dicta:109 
… Used in that sense, the information stored in the sequence of nucleotides coding for 
the mutated or polymorphic BRCA1 polypeptide is the same information as that 
contained in the DNA of the person from which the nucleic acid was isolated. It is the 
existence of that information which is an essential element of the invention as claimed. 
The product is the medium in which that information resides. That characteristic also 
attaches to cDNA, covered by the claims, which is synthesised but replicates a naturally 
occurring sequence of exons. 
The HCA has taken the view that cDNA (as covered by Myriad’s claims) is patent ineligible 
because, although it is synthesised (man-made) in the laboratory, it nevertheless ‘replicates a 
naturally occurring sequence of exons’.  For the above reasons, it is submitted that it is (only) in 
regard to the patent eligibility of cDNA that the HCA and USSC apparently diverge in opinion.  
Indeed, insofar as Australia’s position on cDNA is concerned, IP Australia has confirmed the 
                                                          
106 D’Arcy at [3]. 
107 Ibid. at footnote 9. 
108 Ibid. at [73] (emphasis added). 
109 Ibid. at [89] (emphasis added). 
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Patent Office’s examination practice – following the HCA’s D’Arcy ruling – that cDNA will be 
treated as patent ineligible subject matter if ‘the genetic information in the man-made molecule is 
the same as that in the genome of an organism, because the genetic information conveyed by the 
claimed molecule has not been changed, and therefore cannot be considered ‘made’ for the 
assessment of manner of manufacture’.110  It is now clear that the act of ‘isolation, purification or 
synthesis’ per se is insufficient to confer patent eligibility in Australia.111 
From these differing judicial perspectives, one may surmise that the USSC was intent on striking 
a fair balance between on the one hand, allowing Myriad to continue exploiting their patent on 
cDNA but, at the same time, also providing the woman on the street with greater and more 
affordable access to BRCA genetic testing which can now be offered by other service 
providers.112  In Australia, however, the HCA’s decision effectively deprives biotechnology 
companies of any incentive whatsoever to continue investing in R&D that involves isolated 
DNA sequences as well as cDNA sequences. 
Finally, as regards the future of diagnostic method patents, the present outlook in the US – unlike 
in Australia113 – appears bleak as lower courts continue to grapple with the Mayo precedent and, 
on the basis that they are bound by the sweeping language of the patent eligibility test formulated 
in Mayo, impose an almost blanket prohibition against the patenting of (DNA-based) diagnostic 
methods, particularly those which employ well-understood, routine and conventional laboratory 
techniques. 
2.5 EU / UK 
In contrast to the legal positions in the US and Australia, the situation prevailing in Europe/UK is 
quite the opposite. 
First of all, unlike in the US and Australia, a non-exhaustive list of ‘non-inventions’ (such as 
discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods and so on) is expressly codified in Article 
52(2) of the European Patent Convention 2000 (‘EPC’) as well as section 1(2) of the UK Patents 
Act 1977.  Despite the existence of these provisions, the patent eligibility of isolated gene 
sequences in Europe was never seriously in question, as can be gleaned from the case law of the 
European Patent Office (‘EPO’).  For example, the Opposition Division of the EPO in Howard 
Florey/Relaxin Patent Application114 upheld the patent eligibility of isolated DNA fragments 
encoding human H2-relaxin genes on the basis that they were not mere discoveries under Article 
52(2) EPC. 
                                                          
110 See http://manuals.ipaustralia.gov.au/patents/Patent_Examiners_Manual.htm at [2.9.2.6] (‘Nucleic Acids and 
Genetic Information’). 
111 Ibid. 
112 ‘The result achieved by the [USSC] … reaches a pragmatic middle ground. Isolated DNA, which is most relevant 
for diagnostic and research purposes, is no longer patentable subject matter, but cDNA, which is more closely tied to 
commercial therapeutics, remains eligible for patenting’ (per Peter Lee (n 27) at 1112). 
113 See Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 253 CLR 284; [2013] HCA 50. 
114 [1995] EPOR 541. 
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Subsequently, the adoption by the European Parliament and Council in 1998 of the EU 
Biotechnology Directive (the ‘Biotech Directive’)115 sent a clear signal that patent protection in 
Europe was available for naturally occurring biological material (e.g. gene sequences) which had 
been specifically isolated,116 so long as the industrial applicability of the invention in question 
(e.g. its technical function) was sufficiently disclosed in the patent application.117  Indeed, the 
Europeans take the view that the act of ‘isolation’ is considered to be ‘the result of technical 
processes used to identify, purify and classify [the gene sequence] and to reproduce it outside the 
human body, techniques which human beings alone are capable of putting into practice and 
which nature is incapable of accomplishing by itself’.118  The focus therefore is on the act of 
isolation itself (involving a technical process or some form of human intervention), as opposed 
to the American/Australian perspective which regards isolated gene sequences as nothing more 
than mere embodiments of naturally occurring genetic information (and hence patent ineligible). 
To further illustrate the sharp divide – as regards whether isolated gene sequences constitute 
patentable subject matter – between American/Australian jurisprudence on the one hand and that 
of Europe/UK on the other, let us briefly consider the fairly recent decision of the UK Supreme 
Court (‘UKSC’) in Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly & Co (‘HGS’),119 which concerned 
the validity of an isolated gene sequence patent for a novel human protein (namely, Neutrokine-
α). 
Although the primary issue before the UKSC – namely, the extent to which a patent for 
biological material must disclose and hence satisfy the requirement of industrial applicability in 
Articles 52 and 57 EPC120 – was not the same as that in the twin Myriad decisions, the apex court 
in England, after overruling the Court of Appeal which had upheld the trial judge’s decision, 
nevertheless handed down a unanimous judgment which affirmed the validity of the patent in 
suit (as did the Technical Board of Appeal in parallel, opposition proceedings brought before the 
EPO).  Their Lordships arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding that (1) the claims in question 
                                                          
115 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions, 30 July 1998, OJ (L 213) p 13 et seq (the ‘Biotech Directive’). The relevant provisions 
of the Biotech Directive (namely, Articles 3(2), 5(2) and 5(3)) have been implemented in domestic law: see Rules 
26-29 of the EPC (Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents) as well as 
Paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of Schedule A2 to the UK Patents Act 1977 (introduced by the Patents Regulations 2000 (SI 
2000/2037)). 
116 Articles 3(2) and 5(2) of the Biotech Directive. 
117 Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive. See also Recitals 22 to 25 of the Biotech Directive and Paragraph 6 of 
Schedule A2 to the UK Patents Act 1977. For an illustration of the importance of this requirement, see the CJEU’s 
ruling in Monsanto Technology LLC v Cefetra BV (C-428/08) [2011] Bus LR 1498, but contra the UK Supreme 
Court’s decision in Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly & Co [2012] RPC 6 (‘HGS’) (discussed below). For a 
good discussion of the dichotomy between absolute product protection and purpose-bound product protection 
inherent in the interpretation of this requirement and a robust critique of the CJEU’s ruling, see Sven Bostyn, ‘A 
decade after the birth of the biotech directive: was it worth the trouble?’ in Emanuela Arezzo & Gustavo Ghidini 
(eds.), Biotechnology and Software Patent Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) at 224-235. 
118 Recital 21 of the Biotech Directive. 
119 [2012] RPC 6. 
120 Implemented, domestically, in sections 1(1)(c) and 4 of the UK Patents Act 1977. 
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were, inter alia, for naturally occurring nucleotide sequences of encoding genes; and (2) the 
patent specification in HGS contained ‘contentions’/’predictions’ (or ‘wide-ranging and 
generalised suggestions’) as to the biological properties and therapeutic activities of Neutrokine-
α.121 
Indeed, in preferring not to set too high a threshold for industrial applicability in the context of 
biological patents (which the courts below appeared to have done),122 Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Hope (who delivered the main, but separate, judgments in HGS) were particularly swayed by a 
number of factors – including the astronomical costs associated with R&D which bioscience 
companies must invest in as well as the fact that funding for such R&D is very much dependent 
on the patent portfolios of these companies.  As Lord Neuberger perceptively observed, setting 
the bar for patentability too high ‘would cause UK bioscience companies great difficulty in 
attracting investment at an early stage in the research and development process’.123  Or, as Lord 
Walker put it, a strong policy argument for allowing the appeal would be ‘to reduce the risk of a 
chilling effect on investment in bioscience’, although his Lordship did acknowledge that the 
arguments in this regard ‘were certainly not all one way’.124 
Be that as it may, the decision in HGS (described by Lord Hope as a ‘difficult and troublesome 
case’)125 clearly represents the current judicial and legislative sentiment in Europe/UK – the 
policy drive to facilitate (particularly in economic terms) R&D in biotechnology for the greater 
public good in healthcare.  This pro-patentee/industry mentality is also evident in relation to the 
patent eligibility of diagnostic methods. 
Again, unlike in the US and Australia (where the patent statutes are silent on the matter), Article 
53(c) EPC 2000126 as well as section 4A of the UK Patents Act 1977 (as amended in 2004)127 
contain an express exclusion from patentability for inventions that comprise a method of 
(medical) treatment of the human/animal body or a method of diagnosis practised on the 
human/animal body.128  The rationale for this exclusion used to be premised on the ‘legal fiction’ 
that such methods were incapable of industrial application, though it now seems preferable to 
argue that such methods ought to be excluded from patentability for ‘socio-ethical and public 
                                                          
121 HGS at [3], [9] and [103]. Apparently, ‘[t]he range of diseases and conditions which Neutrokine-α and antibodies 
to Neutrokine-α might be used to diagnose and treat were astonishing and there was no data of any kind to support 
the claims made’ (Ibid. at [159]). 
122 Lord Neuberger, writing extra-judicially, posed the question this way: ‘… whether the claims of the patent 
concerned show a sufficient degree of promise so far as industrial applicability is concerned to justify the applicant 
being granted a monopoly to fence off that class of chemicals, so that the rest of the pharmaceutical industry is kept 
off, for 20 years’ (per Lord Neuberger, ‘Intellectual Property in the United Kingdom and Europe’ [2014] EIPR 693 
at 696). 
123 HGS at [100]. 
124 Ibid. at [171]. 
125 Ibid. at [141]. 
126 Cf. the ‘old’ Article 52(4) EPC 1973. 
127 Section 4A was inserted into the UK Patents Act 1977 by section 1 of the UK Patents Act 2004. 
128 Cf. Article 27(3)(a) of TRIPS. 
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health considerations’.129  In other words, the policy behind the exclusion is aimed at ensuring 
that the practice of medicine by various professionals can be carried on without them having to 
consider whether a patent licence is necessary for any method of treatment or diagnosis.130 
Even with this exclusionary provision inherent in European patent law, the EPO has, in its 
established jurisprudence, consistently adopted a ‘narrow interpretation’ of the predecessor 
provision to Article 53(c) – i.e. Article 52(4) EPC 1973 – in determining whether diagnostic 
methods practised on the human/animal body ought to be excluded from patentability. 
A method of diagnosis necessarily entails a multi-step procedure – from the examination phase 
(gathering of data), comparison phase (comparing data with standard values), identification 
phase (finding of deviation, if any) to the diagnosis phase (deductive medical decision for 
curative purposes).  According to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (‘EBA’) of the EPO in 
CYGNUS/Diagnostic methods, the Article 52(4) exclusion will only apply to diagnostic methods 
which cover all of these steps/procedures (the ‘narrow interpretation’) and not to those which 
relate only to the diagnosis phase (the ‘broad interpretation’).131  Further, all these method steps 
must be of a ‘technical nature’ and must also involve ‘interaction’ with the human/animal body 
(suggesting that in vitro diagnostic tests, performed on blood/tissue samples removed from the 
body, fall outside the exclusion).132 
The above reasoning of the EBA in CYGNUS/Diagnostic methods has been consistently 
endorsed and applied in subsequent EPO case law and has also been followed by the UK 
Intellectual Property Office.133  Effectively speaking, the adoption by the EBA of the ‘narrow 
interpretation’ of the Article 52(4)/Article 53(c) exclusion ‘means that many diagnostic methods 
will no longer be caught by the exclusion despite the express language of the EPC 2000 and the 
[UK] Patents Act 1977’.134 
A case in point before the EPO actually involved Myriad’s own claim to the diagnostic method 
invention which, together with its product claim for the isolated BRCA gene sequences, lay at 
the heart of the Myriad litigation in the US and Australia.  The Technical Board of Appeal in 
Case T 0080/05 confirmed the patent eligibility of Myriad’s invention on the basis that the claim 
in question was directed at an in vitro method for diagnosing a predisposition to breast and 
                                                          
129 CYGNUS/Diagnostic methods (G 1/04) [2006] EPOR 15; [2006] OJ EPO 334 (EBA) at [4]; Abbott 
Respiratory/Dosage regime [2010] EPOR 262 (EBA) at 273. 
130 CYGNUS/Diagnostic methods (G 1/04) [2006] EPOR 15; [2006] OJ EPO 334 (EBA) at [4]. 
131 Ibid. at [6] and [8]. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Case T 0992/03 (Treatment by surgery/Medi-Physics) [2007] OJ EPO 557 (TBA) at 563; Case T 0666/05 
(Mutation/University of Utah) of 13 November 2008; Case T 0080/05 (Method of diagnosis/University of Utah) of 
19 November 2008 (see below); Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University 
Press, 4th Ed, 2014) at 449; UK Intellectual Property Office, Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications 
relating to Medical Inventions in the Intellectual Property Office (April 2016) at [54]-[68]. 
134 Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2014) at 449. 
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ovarian cancer in a human subject.135  Therefore, the claim did not fall foul of the Article 53(c) 
exclusion – which, according to precedent, only applies where all the requisite steps/procedures 
of a technical nature necessary for making a diagnosis are performed on a living human or 
animal body.136  The tribunal here was of the view that all method steps of a technical nature, as 
covered by Myriad’s claim, were ‘performed on a tissue sample of a human subject’ and hence 
did not recite patent ineligible subject matter under Article 53(c).137 
In sum, the European perspective as outlined above – unlike the bleak outlook in the US – is far 
more permissive with regard to the patent eligibility of diagnostic methods, specifically those 
relating to in vitro diagnostic tests performed on blood/tissue samples which have been removed 
from the human body. 
2.6 Summary of jurisdictional perspectives and a comment on the discovery-invention 
distinction 
Having carefully considered the different jurisdictional takes on the issue of gene patenting and 
the patenting of diagnostic methods, the following general observations can be made: 
(1) Insofar as the future of gene patenting is concerned, the US and Australia – in stark 
contrast to the legal positions adopted in Europe/UK – are less inclined, particularly in 
more recent times, to uphold the patent eligibility of naturally occurring gene sequences 
which have been specifically isolated;138 
(2) The US and Australia apparently diverge in judicial opinion as regards the patent 
eligibility of cDNA, with the former affirming and the latter denying; 
(3) The US appears to be in lone territory as regards the patent eligibility of (gene-based) 
diagnostic methods, with Europe and the UK (and possibly Australia) on the more 
permissive side of the divide. 
It is perhaps timely that the courts in the US and Australia have begun to use – more actively – 
the §101 patent eligibility doctrine (in particular, the laws/products of nature exception) as well 
as the concept of a manner of manufacture/patentable invention, respectively, to effect the policy 
objective of filtering out what they deem as unmeritorious subject matter from the ambit of 
patent protection.  Whether or not this approach is doctrinally sound – given that there are other 
                                                          
135 Case T 0080/05 (Method of diagnosis/University of Utah) of 19 November 2008: see http://www.epo.org/law-
practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t050080eu1.html. This was an appeal filed by the patentee against the decision of 
the Opposition Division of the EPO dated 3 November 2004, according to which European Patent No. 0699754 was 
revoked. The Technical Board of Appeal allowed the appeal. 
136 Case T 0080/05 (19 November 2008) at [62]. 
137 Ibid. at [58] and [63] (emphasis added). Cf. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office 
(November 2015 edition), Part G, Chapter II at [4.2.1]: http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/guidelines/e/g_ii_4_2_1.htm. 
138 See, rather ironically, David Brennan, ‘The Trouble with Legislating Exclusions from the Concept of Invention’ 
(2008) 19(1) AIPJ 6 (especially at 8-9). 
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avenues in patent law of achieving the same outcome (e.g. through the established requirements 
of novelty and inventive step/non-obviousness) and particularly so for jurisdictions which do not 
have express statutory exclusions on patentable subject matter (such as the US and Australia) – 
has been the subject of intense debate.   
It is beyond the scope of this paper to embark on a detailed and lengthy discussion of this debate. 
Suffice it to say that there are two opposing camps.  Detractors argue that the breadth of judicial 
discretion inherent in using the doctrine of subject matter eligibility (or the concept of an 
‘invention’) – as a robust ‘policy lever’ for policing the boundaries of patent rights139 – is too 
disconcerting as it injects too much uncertainty and subjectivity into the patent system.140  
Researchers, inventors and investors in biotechnology will all be the poorer for it if judicial 
policy-making were to be taken to the extreme.  Indeed, as Justice Breyer had perceptively 
cautioned in Mayo, 
… too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle [namely, the laws of nature 
exception] could eviscerate patent law. For all inventions at some level embody, use, 
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.141 
Or, as Justice Gordon put it in D’Arcy: 
There may be discovery without invention. But the distinction between discovery and 
invention is not precise enough to be other than misleading. Terms such as ‘the work of 
nature’ and ‘the laws of nature’ are also vague, ambiguous and malleable.142 
Another concern which has been raised is that the purported ‘screening function’ mentioned 
above (in weeding out unworthy subject matter), given its attendant problems, might perhaps be 
more appropriately performed by patent law’s other established criteria – such as novelty and 
inventive step/non-obviousness.143  It has been argued that there is no need to conflate the role of 
                                                          
139 See, generally, Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’ (2003) 89 Va L Rev 1575; Sandra Park, 
‘Gene Patents and the Public Interest: Litigating Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics and 
Lessons Moving Forward’ (2014) 15(4) North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 519; Amy Landers, 
‘Patentable Subject Matter as a Policy Driver’ (2015) 53(2) Houston Law Review 505. 
140 See, generally, Paul Michel, ‘The Supreme Court Saps Patent Certainty’ (2014) 82 George Washington Law 
Review 1751; Christopher Holman, ‘Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain 
Effect’ (2014) 82 George Washington Law Review 1796; Peter Lee (n 27); Timothy Holbrook and Mark Janis, 
‘Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience Perspective’ (2015) 17 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology 
Law 349; David Taylor (n 16). 
141 Mayo at 1293. See also Chief Judge Rader’s dicta in CLS Bank Int’l v Alice Corp Pty Ltd 717 F 3d 1269 at 1298 
(Fed Cir 2013). 
142 D’Arcy at [223] (footnotes omitted), citing NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 264. 
143 Take, for instance, the Myriad litigation in the US where subject matter eligibility was not the only doctrinal 
ground available for challenging Myriad’s BRCA gene patents. In particular, the non-obviousness doctrine 
represented another avenue for invalidating these patents. The American Civil Liberties Union had indeed 
considered challenging Myriad’s patents on non-obviousness grounds but ultimately decided that §101’s prohibition 
on patenting laws/products of nature was best suited for asserting the larger public interest in opposing gene patents. 
In any event, it has been argued that the now-routine nature of DNA isolation, sequencing, and discerning nucleotide 
sequences from known protein structures is likely to render much isolated DNA obvious under 35 USC §103 
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subject matter eligibility with that of the statutory requirements for patentability.144  Instead, the 
patent eligibility doctrine should simply act as a ‘coarse filter’ – sort of a preliminary, low 
threshold requirement – to be invoked only in rare and extreme cases (e.g. to bar ‘manifestly 
abstract’ inventions).145 
Indeed, Lord Hoffmann had, many years ago, advised that judges should ‘… put on one side 
their intuitive sense of what constitutes an invention until they have considered the questions of 
novelty, inventiveness and so forth’.146  His Lordship described the concept of an ‘invention’ as 
an inquiry which ‘would almost invariably be academic’, suggesting in passing that the other 
statutory criteria for patentability would, in all likelihood, ‘contain every element of the concept 
of an invention in ordinary speech’.147 
Yet, there are also many proponents of the alternative school of thought.  For instance, Justice 
Breyer in Mayo opined that shifting §101’s ‘screening function’ to the other statutory provisions 
(such as §§102, 103 and 112) would not be consistent with the approach adopted in prior case 
law, would effectively render ‘the “law of nature” exception to §101 patentability a dead letter’ 
as well as would risk ‘creating significantly greater legal uncertainty’.148  His Honour therefore 
concluded that it was inappropriate ‘to substitute §§102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better 
established inquiry under §101’.149 
Likewise, in Australia, Gageler and Nettle JJ in their joint judgment in D’Arcy – in emphasising 
that a manner of new manufacture ‘necessitates invention’150 – have also expressed the same 
sentiments: 
… each of those [earlier] decisions is consistent with the [threshold] requirement, 
essential to the concept of a ‘manner of manufacture’, that the subject matter of a claim 
have about it a quality of inventiveness which distinguishes it from a mere discovery or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Rochelle Dreyfuss, ‘Implications of the DNA Patenting Dispute: A US Response to Dianne Nicol’ (2012) 22 J L 
Inf & Sci 1 at 3). Over in Australia, it has been argued that downplaying the importance of the subject matter inquiry 
and shifting attention towards more specific criteria such as novelty and inventive step would ‘provide more 
certainty and transparency’ and that ‘[g]iven the ongoing problems with the subject-matter inquiry, this is perhaps 
the most preferable option’ (Brad Sherman (n 99) at 145-146). 
144 One commentator has argued thus: ‘… the relationship between Section 101 and other limiting statutory sections 
is at best unclear. As presently employed, Section 101 seems to duplicate doctrinal filters associated with other 
patentability provisions, leaving one to wonder what purpose is served by such redundancy’ (Dan Burk, ‘Dolly and 
Alice’ (2015) 2(3) Journal of Law and the Biosciences 606 at 622). See also CLS Bank Int’l v Alice Corp Pty Ltd 
717 F 3d 1269 at 1302 (Fed Cir 2013); the 2004 Australian Law Reform Commission report on gene patenting (see 
D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc (2014) 313 ALR 627; [2014] FCAFC 115 at [158]); Advisory Council on Intellectual 
Property, Patentable Subject Matter: Final Report, (2010) at 9 (see D’Arcy at [129]). 
145 Research Corp Techs Inc v Microsoft Corp 627 F 3d 859 at 869 (Fed Cir 2010). 
146 Biogen v Medeva [1997] RPC 1 at [46] (emphasis added). 
147 Ibid. at [44]. 
148 Mayo at 1303-1304. 
149 Ibid. at 1304. 
150 D’Arcy at [165] (emphasis added). 
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observation of a law of nature. That [threshold] requirement is separate and distinct from 
the other requirements of inventive step and novelty.151 
Their Honours were simply endorsing the views expressed in an earlier HCA decision in N V 
Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v Mirabella International Pty Ltd, where Brennan, Deane and 
Toohey JJ observed that the ‘threshold requirement of “an alleged invention”’ did not necessarily 
‘[correspond] with or [render] otiose the more specific requirements of novelty and inventive 
step … contained in s 18(1)(b)’.152 
Outside of the US and Australia, mention must be made of Lord Mustill’s dicta in Biogen v 
Medeva,153 lest it be thought that the House of Lords was wholly in agreement with Lord 
Hoffmann’s views on the ‘invariably’ ‘academic’ nature of the invention inquiry.154  Instead, 
Lord Mustill adopted quite a contrary view of the matter which, for its instructive value, ought to 
be set out in full below: 
I should not be taken to accept, without full argument, that the need for an invention 
would always be academic … Certainly, in the great majority of cases, there will be no 
need to complicate the enquiry by looking outside the four conditions [set out in section 
1(1) of the UK Patents Act 1977]. The traditional law of patents is, however, in the 
course of adapting itself to new technologies, beyond contemplation when the 
foundations of that law were established. This process is not without strain, and I believe 
that in some instances a close conceptual analysis of the nature of patentability will not 
be a waste of time. Such a case was Genentech Inc’s Patent where the claim was for a 
product already existing in nature, a subject far distant from the mechanical and chemical 
inventions to which so much of traditional patent law relates. There may well be others in 
the future.155 
With respect, these are very perceptive remarks as his Lordship could already portend the future 
course of patent law developments two decades in advance of his time – in our case, 
developments in biotechnology and the patenting of isolated gene sequences and diagnostic 
methods (for example, as illustrated recently in the Myriad line of cases in the US and Australia). 
On balance, there is, in this author’s view, much to commend the US/Australian approach to 
patent eligibility.  After all, putting aside the legal ramifications (if any) of jurisdictions which 
have not expressly provided for a list of excluded subject matter in their patent legislation,156 we 
                                                          
151 Ibid. at [131] (emphasis added). See also [133]. 
152 (1995) 183 CLR 655 at 663-664. 
153 [1997] RPC 1. 
154 Ibid. at [44]. 
155 Ibid. at [5] (emphasis added). Lord Mustill was simply echoing his own dicta in Genentech Inc’s Patent [1989] 
RPC 147 at 262. 
156 It is worth pointing out that jurisdictions which do provide for a list of ‘non-inventions’ in their patent legislation 
(such as the UK) have, perhaps ironically, been far more accommodating as regards the patent eligibility of isolated 
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must remember that the law of patents is ultimately concerned with rewarding the skill, effort 
and ingenuity of inventors whose intellectual output must necessarily take the form of inventions.  
We are also reminded by Article 27(1) of TRIPS that ‘… patents shall be available for any 
inventions … in all fields of technology …’  There is therefore considerable force to the 
argument that courts should not simply pay lip service to the discovery-invention distinction (or 
indeed to any of the other judicially-recognised exceptions to patentable subject matter) when 
considering subject matter eligibility (or the question of whether an ‘invention’ is truly at hand) 
for the purposes of determining patentability.  As a British judge quite rightly put it, ‘… whoever 
controls the meaning of ‘invention’ controls what can be patented and hence an important aspect 
of industrial policy’.157 
Be that as it may, it is still the ultimate aim of this paper – notwithstanding the clear differences 
in legislative and judicial opinion in the various jurisdictions surveyed above – to attempt to 
offer a view on the principal question under investigation, namely whether patent protection 
ought to extend to isolated gene sequences (and, by association, diagnostic methods).  In order to 
arrive at an informed conclusion one way or the other, it is helpful at this juncture to embark on a 
close analysis of the myriad policy reasons which have been proffered both in support of as well 
as against gene patenting and the patenting of diagnostic methods.  And, as we shall soon 
discover, there are good arguments on both sides of the policy debate.158 
3. Policy considerations 
3.1 Against patenting 
It should be mentioned at the outset that arguments against gene patenting on grounds of 
morality or ordre public (or even human dignity and human rights) are beyond the scope of 
discussion in this paper.159  Suffice it to say that the Opposition Division of the EPO in Howard 
Florey/Relaxin Patent Application160 had categorically stated that DNA was not life but a mere 
chemical substance which carried genetic information.161  The patenting of a single human gene 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
gene sequences than jurisdictions which are silent on the matter (such as the US and Australia) and where the courts 
have sought to fill the lacuna by judicially recognising certain implicit exceptions to patent eligibility. 
157 In re Patent Applications GB 0226884.3 & 0419317.3 by CFPH LLC [2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat) at [10], per Mr 
Peter Prescott QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge). See also the views expressed in Jessica Lai, ‘Gene-related Patents in 
Australia and New Zealand: Taking a Step Back’ (2015) 25 AIPJ 181 at 195-197; Justine Pila, ‘The future of the 
requirement for an invention: inherent patentability as a pre- and post-patent determinant’ in Emanuela Arezzo & 
Gustavo Ghidini (eds.), Biotechnology and Software Patent Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) at 55. 
158 Numerous academics around the world have weighed in on the debate: see, e.g., Naomi Hawkins, ‘A red herring: 
invalidity of human gene sequence patents’ [2016] 38(2) EIPR 83 and the list of articles cited in footnote 5 therein. 
159 For a good overview of the ethical and moral considerations surrounding gene patenting, see Stephanie Constand, 
‘Patently a Problem? Human Gene Patenting and Its Ethical and Practical Implications’ (2013) 13(1) QUT Law 
Review 100; Belinda Huang, ‘Biotech patents in Australia: Raising the bar on the generally inconvenient exception’ 
(2013) 24 AIPJ 40; Andrea Stazi, Part IV of Biotechnological Inventions and Patentability of Life (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2015). See also Article 53(a) EPC; sections 1(3) and 1(4) of the UK Patents Act 1977; Article 6(1) of the 
Biotech Directive; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA (London, July 2002). 
160 [1995] EPOR 541. 
161 Ibid. at 551. 
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therefore had nothing to do with the patenting of human life.  The Opposition Division further 
took the view that even if every gene in the human genome were cloned (and possibly patented), 
it would still be impossible to reconstitute a human being from the sum of its genes. 
One of the most oft-cited reasons for denying gene patents concerns patient access to genetic 
testing and the associated issues of pricing and affordability.  The exclusivity offered by patent 
protection often tempts patentees, like Myriad, to raise prices for the use/acquisition of the 
invention in question, such as vital drugs, diagnostic tests and other medical treatment.  Doing 
away with patents in the field of molecular diagnostics, for example, will enable multiple 
companies to offer similar tests at much reduced prices, thereby generating increased market 
competition for the overall benefit of healthcare consumers.162  Denying Myriad its BRCA 
patents will therefore serve the larger public interest. 
Relevantly, in the context of Australia, the Medicare (government-supported) healthcare system 
is also implicated.  Royalties and licensing costs will likely rise as companies, like Myriad, 
exploit their patent monopolies because the apportioned funds by the state will have to be 
channelled to meet these higher costs.  Denying Myriad its patents, it has been argued, will thus 
lower healthcare expenditure and free the healthcare budget for other useful purposes.163 
Price aside, such public health concerns are also valid because ‘[p]atents allow a situation where 
a single provider has the monopoly on the provision of a particular genetic test, which means that 
patients are unable to access alternative testing for confirmation or as a second opinion’.164  The 
desirability for verification of test results and the ability of patients to obtain access to screening 
tests offered by other service providers also weigh against the grant of gene patents and patents 
for diagnostic methods. 
Another concern raised is that because isolating DNA sequences is invariably the first step to 
serious scientific work regarding genes (including clinical diagnostic testing), gene patents have 
                                                          
162 Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that following the USSC’s decision in Myriad, other healthcare providers 
began to offer BRCA screening tests at prices cheaper than Myriad’s: see http://www.ajmc.com/journals/evidence-
based-oncology/2014/May-2014/Choosing-a-BRCA-Genetic-Testing-Laboratory-A-Patient-Centric-and-Ethical-
Call-to-Action-for-Clinicians-and-Payers. See also Lori Andrews, ‘Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual 
Property Rights’ (2002) 3 Nature Reviews Genetics 803 at 803-805; Timothy Caulfield et al, ‘Evidence and 
Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies’ (2006) 24 Nature Biotechnology 1091 at 1091; 
Susanne Haga & Huntington Willard, ‘Defining the Spectrum of Genome Policy’ (2006) 7 Nature Reviews Genetics 
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Access to Genetic Tests’ (available at http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf). 
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the ‘chilling effect’ of excluding other researchers/laboratories from engaging in any 
scientific/research work in respect of the gene(s) in question – e.g. from using the gene(s) as a 
valuable research tool.165  Researchers/laboratories will most likely cease testing altogether when 
faced with a patent infringement lawsuit – e.g. Myriad’s assertion of its patent rights in the US 
sharply curtailed clinical diagnostic testing at the University of Pennsylvania’s Genetic 
Diagnostic Laboratory.166  There is also some empirical evidence that reveals the negative effects 
of such patents on the development of new diagnostic tests and the availability of alternative 
testing services.167  One survey found that 25% of laboratories stopped performing clinical 
genetic testing because of patent concerns, while 53% did not develop new genetic tests because 
of similar concerns.168 
The theoretical argument, it seems, is that more simultaneous research on diagnostic testing 
performed by a broader scientific community unconstrained by patents will likely yield more 
robust innovation than that by a single patentee seeking to commercialise his own invention.169  
Yet, on the other hand, there is also evidence to the contrary – where empirical research has 
found little direct evidence of any chilling effect whatsoever in the research context,170 a point to 
which we will return below. 
Finally, it has also been argued that there are other (financial) incentives available – apart from 
incentives arising from the patent system – to motivate biomedical and genomics research and 
for the development of associated diagnostic products/tests.  For example, the potential 
availability of private research funding,171 government subsidies and other tax benefits do cast 
some doubt on the need to continually rely on patent protection as an added incentive in this 
regard.172 
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3.2 Pro patenting 
To be weighed against all the above reasons pointing against the grant of gene patents and 
patents for diagnostic methods are the following, perhaps more compelling, arguments in favour 
of the opposite. 
It is trite that a strong and efficient patent regime can boost a nation’s economic growth and 
development, particularly in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering and the life sciences 
generally.  The promise of exclusive rights, albeit time-limited, provides the necessary monetary 
incentives that lead to discovery, creation and invention.  In particular, the impetus for large 
scale capital investment in biotechnology is the potential commercial rewards that can be reaped 
from the patent system.173  In other words, the lack of such incentives will likely discourage 
research and innovation in this field (because the inventive process is time sensitive, financially 
risky and carries no guarantee of commercial success) and is therefore antithetical to a nation’s 
vision of enhancing biomedical research and healthcare delivery.174 
In response to critics who cite the negative effects of gene patents (and associated licensing 
practices of patentees) on the provision of diagnostic services and on issues of patient 
accessibility and affordability, there are also empirical studies which find that there is very little, 
if any, correlation between the existence of gene patents and price inflation for diagnostic 
services.  For example, one extensive study compared Myriad’s offering of diagnostic testing for 
BRCA genes (as sole provider in the US) with its offering of Lynch syndrome testing for 
colorectal cancer genes (where, in the US, it faced some competition).  It was found that as 
between the two, BRCA testing by Myriad was, in fact, cheaper on a per unit basis even though 
Myriad faced no competition for the same in the US.175  Indeed, as one commentator has 
declared, ‘competition does little to affect price overall’.176 
On the contrary, it has been argued that patent exclusivity actually serves to enhance (rather than 
hinder) patient access.  One researcher found that while prices for BRCA and Lynch syndrome 
testing were comparable, many more BRCA tests were performed by Myriad in the US 
                                                          
173 Ted Sichelman & Stuart Graham, ‘Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study’ (2010) 17 Mich Telecomm 
& Tech L Rev 111 at 158-159; Michael Hopkins & Stuart Hogarth, ‘Biomarker Patents for Diagnostics: Problem or 
Solution?’ (2012) 30 Nature Biotechnology 498 at 499; Bronwyn Hall and Dietmar Harhoff, ‘Recent Research on 
the Economics of Patents’ (2012) 4 Annual Review of Economics 541. 
174 ‘Innovators in molecular diagnostics rely heavily on venture capital to fund the years of research, development, 
and validation necessary to bring a novel diagnostic product to market, and the decision of whether to invest is 
heavily dependent upon the availability of effective patent protection. Weakening of patent protection for molecular 
diagnostics will inevitably cause venture capitalists to shift their investments to other sectors of the economy’ 
(Christopher Holman (n 51) at 307-308; footnotes omitted). See also [7.23] of the ALRC report on gene patenting 
(available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-99). 
175 Robert Cook-Deegan et al, ‘Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for 
Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers’ (2010) 12 Genetics 
in Medicine S15 at S23-S24 (paper available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3047448/). 
176 Andrew Robertson (n 164) at 387. See also the three reasons proffered as to why invalidating gene patents is 
unlikely to have a major impact on the price of genetic testing: Naomi Hawkins (n 158) at 88. 
31 
 
compared to Lynch syndrome testing.177  Before Myriad was decided by the USSC, there were 
fifteen providers of Lynch syndrome testing in the US and only one authorised provider of 
BRCA testing (namely, Myriad).  Yet, in the period from June 2010 through March 2013, 
‘nearly five times as many patients in the US received BRCA testing than testing for Lynch 
syndrome (339,294 vs. 70,294)’.178  And the primary reason for this discrepancy in test numbers 
is due to an increased public awareness in the US of the availability and benefits of BRCA 
testing relative to Lynch syndrome testing.179 
In yet another study conducted recently on the effect of gene patents on the diagnostic testing 
landscape both within and outside of the US, researchers came to the conclusion that ‘… the risk 
that blocking patent claims could impede access to a broad range of common genetic tests is a 
distinctly North American problem (with some parallels in Japan)’.180  They have therefore 
advised that ‘… it would be unwise to extrapolate concerns about the overreach of gene patents 
and licensing practices from the United States to other jurisdictions’.181  Indeed, research 
undertaken elsewhere suggests that the global impact arising from this phenomenon has 
generally been far less profound.182  In Europe, for example, it appears that existing gene patents 
have been broadly ignored in spite of the many strict legal rights that patentees may have been 
able to enforce.183 
In any event, there are in place other legal mechanisms for monitoring the prices of patented 
genetic inventions and to prevent patentees from engaging in anticompetitive practices – most 
notably, through the statutory compulsory licensing scheme (from within the IP framework) and 
the operation of competition law.184  These available measures – as well as the more 
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controversial use of patent pools to address anticommons risks185 – go some way in ensuring that 
gene patents (and associated licensing practices) do not adversely impact upon biomedical 
research and, more importantly for our purposes, cost-effective access to healthcare services. 
In sum, arguments that gene patents do restrict patient access to genetic testing – because of, 
inter alia, pricing and affordability issues – are certainly not all one way.  In fact, one 
commentator has made the intriguing observation that gene patents actually incentivise patentees 
to work closely with insurance companies so as to ensure that a ‘maximum number of patients 
will be able to get insurance reimbursement’ for their genetic testing services.186 
Issues of accessibility aside, it has also been forcefully argued that the granting of gene patents 
will, on the whole, lead to more publicly available information as a result of the patent disclosure 
requirements under statute law.  If, on the other hand, patent eligibility standards (e.g. under 
§101) are unrealistically heightened, inventors may become more wary and choose to keep their 
creations and inventions (particularly those concerning methods of medical treatment and 
diagnosis) a trade secret, rather than to attempt a patent filing.187  This will, in turn, lead to a net 
decrease in the aggregate of new scientific information/knowledge or – in the words of Judge 
Newman (dissenting) in the Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in Ariosa – to a 
situation where that ‘breakthrough’ diagnostic method might otherwise remain a ‘laboratory 
curiosity’.188 
Finally, addressing the concern that gene patents may have a negative impact on the conduct of 
biomedical/genomics research (a.k.a. the ‘patent thicket’ or ‘patent anticommons’ problem), this 
is certainly not the case where researchers merely engage in basic research in a non-commercial 
context.  As one commentator puts it, ‘… empirical studies have shown that basic researchers 
follow a norm of ignoring patent infringement, and that patent owners do not enforce their 
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patents against basic researchers, resulting in a de facto research exemption from liability’.189  
Several reasons account for why patentees are reluctant to sue university scientists and 
researchers – e.g. the lack of monetary damages, fear of undermining potential licensing 
relationships and concerns about harming public relations.190 
Take, for example, Myriad’s own company policy which freely allowed basic researchers to 
conduct and publish thousands of research studies on the BRCA genes.  As explained by the 
Federal Circuit, Myriad’s cease-and-desist notifications to potential defendants ‘… did not apply 
to research testing “for the purpose of furthering non-commercial research programs, the results 
of which are not provided to the patient and for which no money is received”’.191  Myriad was 
simply asserting its patent rights against competing clinical laboratories that were engaged in 
commercial genetic testing (i.e. those that charged patients for diagnostic services).  Therefore, 
despite widespread concerns, the truth of the matter is that gene patents rarely block academic, 
non-commercial research and access to genetic material.  On the contrary, it has been suggested 
that ‘… the net effect of patents on basic biomedical research has been a positive one’.192 
In any event, it is possible for researchers engaged in basic R&D, in the face of an infringement 
action, to avail themselves of the statutory ‘experimental use’ defence (where available).193  The 
‘experimental use’ defence – which generally allows researchers to discover more about (or to 
improve upon) the invention and its properties – may be regarded as a possible, if weak, 
alternative to subject matter exclusion from patentability.194 
This probably explains why it may be preferable, for the sake of clarity and certainty in this field 
of cutting-edge research, for the Legislature to specifically introduce a distinct exception to the 
infringement of gene patents for non-commercial (or not-for-profit) diagnostic/clinical testing 
purposes, whilst at the same time endorsing the desirability of granting such patents (if so 
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intended).  As one commentator has helpfully suggested,195 this carefully crafted exception ought 
to be able to allow doctors and laboratory personnel to conduct ‘home brew’ genetic testing for 
their patients without having ‘… to carry out freedom to operate searches, invent around or 
license patents’.196  This exception, however, should not extend to exempt from infringement 
liability commercial test kit developers and distributors.197  Such a suggestion, which seems 
entirely sensible to this author, also appears to accord with the resolution of the Long QT patent 
dispute in Canada.198  It will be recalled that as part of the settlement agreement between the 
parties, the patentee had agreed to allow all Canadian public sector hospitals and laboratories to 
test Canadian patients for Long QT syndrome on a not-for-profit basis.  This is certainly a win-
win, compromise solution for all parties and may well pave the way forward for policy makers in 
all other jurisdictions, who perennially struggle to achieve the appropriate balance between 
giving effect to the economic interests of patent owners on the one hand and safeguarding the 
wider interests of healthcare consumers on the other. 
4. Conclusion 
It is apparent, from the discourse in this paper, that the regulatory environment for innovation in 
biotechnology (genetic engineering and molecular diagnostics in particular) is highly complex 
and also in a constant state of flux.  This has vast implications for the industry’s numerous 
stakeholders, who are often guided in their research endeavours and investment decisions not just 
by legislative and judicial sources of regulation (the former, if any, and the latter, if at all 
consistent and defensible), but also by the examination practices of national and regional patent 
offices (recently thrown into disarray in certain jurisdictions) as well as by the informal norms of 
patent holders in the field (e.g. Myriad not legally pursuing basic researchers).  It may seem 
preferable, in theory, to examine all facets of the regulatory environment for biotechnological 
inventions in each of the jurisdictions surveyed above.  However, the aims of this paper are far 
more modest as the focus of discussion – particularly in the first part of the paper – has largely 
been on the legal framework only. 
With this contextual caveat in mind, what lessons can we draw from the Mayo and twin Myriad 
decisions? 
Although the USSC’s reasoning and decision in Myriad on cDNA’s patent eligibility can be 
criticised, this author reiterates the view expressed earlier that both the USSC and HCA did 
arrive at the correct conclusion as regards the patent ineligibility of naturally occurring gene 
sequences that have been isolated.  The apex courts in the US and Australia arguably adopt a 
comparatively higher threshold for patentable subject matter by paying due regard to the 
discovery-invention distinction and ensuring that unmeritorious subject matter is denied 
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patentability through the jurisdictions’ respective gate-keeping mechanisms – namely, the §101 
‘pre-emption’ doctrine for subject matter eligibility as well as the concept of a ‘manner of 
manufacture’ (or the search for a ‘patentable invention’). 
Unfortunately, inventors, biotechnology companies and potential investors in the US and 
Australia will all have to labour under considerable uncertainty as a result of these decisions (and 
of the lower courts’ reading of these decisions) going forward.  This is particularly so where the 
claimed subject matter in question – whether it be a composition of matter claim for isolated 
gene sequences or a method claim for gene-based diagnostic applications – is derived from 
nature, is an application of a natural phenomenon or is otherwise premised upon well-
understood, routine and conventional activity.  To what extent are patentees or potential 
applicants able to ensure that their patent claims have been drafted with sufficient specificity and 
transformation so as to evidence how and why the invention as claimed is ‘markedly different’ 
from the underlying, naturally occurring material/process?  Has there been sufficient ‘human 
intervention’ and do the claims in question do ‘significantly more’ than simply regurgitate the 
underlying law of nature? 
Given the breadth of judicial discretion inherent in the application of these patent eligibility 
concepts and doctrines, there are certainly no easy answers to these questions.  However, bearing 
in mind how the careful drafting of claims may well have an impact on the question of patent 
eligibility (at least insofar as the US is concerned), it may be worthwhile paying close heed to 
Judge Dyk’s advice in Ariosa, where His Honour proposed that the breadth of the claim(s) be ‘… 
sufficiently limited to a specific application of the new law of nature discovered by the patent 
applicant and reduced to practice’.199  Notwithstanding that the patent eligibility standards now 
adopted in Australia might well be more stringent (since the HCA has advised that courts should 
be mindful not to allow the ‘form’ of the claim to mask its true ‘substance’), it is submitted that 
claims which have been narrowly tailored in scope to what the applicant has actually invented 
and reduced to practice (which seems akin to the so-called ‘purpose-bound’ patent protection 
theory)200 should pass muster under both the American and Australian thresholds.201  This 
approach should also sufficiently address concerns raised in several earlier cases – particularly 
by the HCA in D’Arcy and the Federal Circuit in Ariosa – about the over-reach of the patent 
monopoly for gene-based inventions. 
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Fortunately, Europe and the UK have largely been spared all this uncertainty,202 due to the fact 
that a concerted (policy) decision was made in 1998 to introduce the Biotech Directive.  It 
therefore comes as little surprise that the UKSC in HGS – following EPO practice – was not 
inclined to set the bar for patentability too high as this might otherwise undermine the raison 
d’être for having the Directive in the first place.  From the discussion above, it seems clear that 
the general sentiment in Europe/UK vis-à-vis the patent eligibility of isolated gene sequences 
and diagnostic methods is very much pro-patentee/industry. 
Be that as it may, Lord Neuberger has aptly observed that ‘[q]uite where the line should be 
drawn in the light of commercial reality and the public interest can no doubt be a matter of 
different opinions and debate’.203  This is particularly true when policy considerations are 
brought into the fray – as they must be on a topic such as this.  Whilst it is acknowledged that 
there are good arguments on both sides of the policy debate, this author’s research thus far has 
not thrown up any compelling (let alone conclusive) evidence to suggest that the grant of gene 
patents and patents for diagnostic methods does, on the whole, do more harm than good.  On the 
contrary, there are many positives arising from such a practice.  On balance, therefore, this 
author leans in favour of the European perspective on the matter, notwithstanding that EU 
member states remain deeply divided over the Biotech Directive.204 
Ultimately though, this must be a question for Parliament alone.  Collectively, the recent 
approaches taken and outcomes reached by the apex courts in the US and Australia to questions 
of patent eligibility do not bode well for legal certainty nor for investor confidence in the 
biotechnology industry.  The same can be said for examinations undertaken at their respective 
patent offices,205 for example as to whether gene patents will be granted at all and for what 
scope. 
If it is deemed that all this uncertainty is indeed unsettling, then it is for Parliament to intervene 
and make the policy decision to legitimise, in true European fashion and after ensuring that 
adequate safeguards are in place,206 the patent eligibility of isolated gene sequences.  Particularly 
in the life sciences field where policy perspectives tend to reside at opposite poles, the 
Legislature – whose capability it is to entertain robust policy debates – should take the lead ‘… 
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in crafting more finely tailored rules’207 as regards patent protection for such nature-based 
subject matter.208  On this point alone, it is helpful to set out the views of one commentator in an 
online article:209 
… patent eligibility is a legal question with vast policy implications. Many of the legal 
issues that will bubble up in and through the courts can’t be anticipated. But decision 
makers can help our innovation system remain more predictable, efficient, and fertile by 
proactively setting clear, purposeful patent law and policy. Doing so will help the country 
stay focused on the strategic goal of innovation and help reduce the legal uncertainty that 
impedes investments in biotechnology – resources that are critically needed to unlock the 
toughest life science mysteries and solve our most consequential challenges. 
Legal certainty and predictability are highly prized attributes not just in the common law world 
but also for the biotechnology industry in general.  The cost of biotechnological and biomedical 
research is huge and investors invariably turn to the patent system in the hope of underpinning 
their investment.  Muddying the waters in this area of the law – e.g. by imposing, through 
judicial discretion, a blanket ban on human gene patenting and the patenting of gene-based 
diagnostic methods – will likely lead to risky (and probably as yet unknown) consequences and 
may well have, to reiterate the point, a ‘chilling effect on investment in bioscience’.210  If so, the 
range of products and diagnostic services that could potentially stem from all future R&D will 
not so easily be brought to market and/or will not be readily available to healthcare consumers.  
In an era where personalised medicine and medical diagnostics are positioned to transform the 
delivery of healthcare globally, this is certainly not a desirable outcome for any jurisdiction.  
Instead, it is the promise of exclusive rights, economic incentives and information flow 
engendered by the patent system – counterbalanced by adequate legal safeguards in favour of the 
public interest – that will help sustain a vibrant and forward-looking biotechnology industry, 
currently perched on the threshold of promising new frontiers,211 well into the 21st century. 
_________________________ 
[This paper has been accepted for publication in Law, Innovation and Technology (2016), 
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210 Per Lord Walker in HGS at [171]. 
211 Or, in the words of three notable academics in 1998, ‘… the threshold of a revolution’ (Roger Brownsword, 
William Cornish and Margaret Llewelyn, ‘Human Genetics and the Law: Regulating a Revolution’ (1998) 61(5) 
Modern Law Review 593 at 593). 
